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A Batson violation—racially discriminatory jury selection—is a structural error,
“not amenable” to harmless error review on direct appeal. By definition, structural
errors evade traditional prejudice analysis. But, when a petitioner argues on
collateral review that their trial counsel provided ineﬀective assistance by failing to
object to a Batson violation, a number of circuits require a showing of Strickland
prejudice. As some of these courts recognize, they demand the impossible.
In 2017, the Supreme Court in Weaver v. Massachusetts suggested that
structural errors that “always result in fundamental unfairness” should not undergo
a prejudice analysis. Instead, courts should presume that these errors cause prejudice.
Though often misread, Weaver marked an important shift in Strickland doctrine. I
argue that, since Batson violations always result in fundamental unfairness, they
merit a presumption of Strickland prejudice.
But many ineﬀective assistance of counsel claims arise on federal habeas corpus
review, and the Weaver Court had no occasion to apply its ruling to the habeas
context. Habeas doctrine features its own prejudice standard: if a claim has
procedurally defaulted in state court, a habeas court will refuse to hear it unless the
petitioner demonstrates “cause” for the failure to raise the claim in state court, and
“prejudice” suﬀered from the violation of the federal right. If it continues to demand
a showing of prejudice, procedural default threatens to preclude federal review of the
newly viable but procedurally defaulted Batson-IAC claims for which Weaver clears
the way.
I investigate Weaver’s impact on one pathway around procedural default: the one
carved by Martinez v. Ryan. Martinez held that ineffective assistance of initialreview postconviction counsel should provide “cause” for the failure to raise a
substantial ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel (IATC) claim in state court.
Martinez elevated procedural fairness over formal roadblocks; it insisted that a
substantial IATC claim must receive at least one airing, in one court. A stubborn
insistence that a Batson-IAC victim show prejudice would construct another formal
roadblock at the expense of procedural fairness. Where a habeas petitioner successfully
invokes Martinez to provide cause, I argue, the habeas court should presume prejudice.
The habeas court should thus reach the claim’s merits: did racial discrimination
infect jury selection?
INTRODUCTION
An attractive but untrue mantra holds that every right has a remedy.1 In
fact, the “harmless error” doctrine permits a criminal conviction to survive

1 See, e.g., John C. Jeﬀries, Jr., Essay, The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J.
87, 87 (1999).
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appeal if the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that a guilty
verdict was unattributable to the error.2
But some types of error evade harmless error analysis because their harm
is too abstract or opaque to calculate.3 These are “structural errors,” and their
victims need not demonstrate their harm in order to obtain relief: an
appellate court will automatically vacate a conviction rather than demand that
deﬁnitionally impossible showing.4 Racial discrimination in jury selection—
known as Batson error—is universally treated as one such error.5
Some courts are less understanding when the Batson error arises in the
context of an ineﬀective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim—channeled
through an argument that trial counsel provided ineﬀective assistance by
failing to object to racially discriminatory jury selection—instead of on direct
appeal. Strickland v. Washington governs IAC claims and requires the
defendant to show that trial counsel performed “deﬁcient[ly]” and that the
deﬁcient performance “prejudiced” the trial’s outcome.6 Like in the harmless
error context, the prejudice showing is impossible. Accordingly, some circuits
waive the requirement and presume prejudice resulting from a structural
error like Batson.7 Others, despite recognizing the impossibility of the task,
do not.8
Given the difficulty of satisfying Batson, a defendant will already struggle to
show deficient performance resulting from the failure to raise a Batson
objection.9 But the circuits that demand an additional prejudice showing
insulate Batson-IAC claims from review entirely, in part because of the opacity
of jury deliberations and in part because of the “Batson paradox”: the Court’s

2 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993); see also Daniel Epps, Harmless Errors and
Substantial Rights, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2117, 2125 (2018) (“The relevant question is not, and can’t be,
whether, if the error had not occurred, some other jury in an alternate universe might have still
reached the same verdict. It is instead . . . whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial
was surely unattributable to the error.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
3 See John H. Blume & Stephen P. Garvey, Harmless Error in Federal Habeas Corpus after Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163, 185 (1993) (explaining the difference between trial errors,
which are definite and subject to harmless error analysis, and structural errors, which are neither).
4 See, e.g., id. at 186-87 (“[R]ights [violated by structural errors] can only be protected and
enforced by shielding them with a rule of automatic reversal.”).
5 See infra note 37.
6 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
7 See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
9 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and
Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 459, 503 (1996) (describing the success rate of
Batson claims as “manifestly unimpressive” and concluding that Batson is “almost surely a failure” at
preventing discriminatory peremptory challenges); People v. Randall, 671 N.E.2d 60, 65-66 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1996) (calling the Batson process a “charade” and listing facially race-neutral reasons for
striking jurors that can hardly “be given without a smile”).
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refusal to acknowledge the impact of race on jury verdicts means that, as a formal
matter, racially discriminatory jury selection error can never cause prejudice.10
In 2017, a Supreme Court case called Weaver v. Massachusetts considered
whether courts should presume prejudice arising from a different structural
error: courtroom closure during jury selection.11 In concluding that they
should not, the Court broadened the Strickland prejudice inquiry beyond its
traditional bounds. The usual Strickland analysis asks merely whether
competent attorney performance, absent the errors, would have led to a
“reasonable probability” of a different result.12 But in Weaver, the Court
indicated that structural errors that “always result[] in fundamental unfairness”
merit a presumption of Strickland prejudice, regardless of their impact on the
trial’s outcome.13 I argue that Batson violations belong in this category: racially
discriminatory jury selection always results in fundamental unfairness.14
If the Batson victim seeks to vindicate his rights on federal habeas corpus
review, rather than state postconviction review, a second, distinct prejudice
requirement awaits. Under the “procedural default” doctrine, a federal court
will refuse to consider a claim that state courts ignored for procedural reasons
unless the habeas petitioner demonstrates “cause” for the failure to raise it
timely in state court and “prejudice” resulting from the alleged violation of a
federal right.15 Though this prejudice requirement is often thought identical
to Strickland’s, the two requirements have diﬀerent origins, and therefore an
argument for a presumption of prejudice in one context may not persuade—
depending on the circuit in which one lives16—in the other. Whereas
Strickland interprets constitutional mandates, procedural default doctrine
simply reﬂects the Court’s attempt to balance competing equitable interests:
a petitioner’s interest in a federal forum to vindicate federal rights against
states’ interests in ﬁnality, federalism, and comity.17 That is, the procedural
default question is not whether a federal court sitting in habeas may hear a
claim that the state court refused to hear, but whether it should.18
In this situation, it should. Equitable principles—and a proceduralist
vision of habeas corpus—in mind, I argue that my interpretation of Weaver
opens a door to habeas review of Batson-IAC claims that procedural default’s
See infra notes 120–123 and accompanying text.
Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984).
Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908; cf. Eve Brensike Primus, Disaggregating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Doctrine: Four Forms of Constitutional Ineffectiveness, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1581, 1649 (2020) (describing the
Weaver Court’s attention to fairness, rather than only outcome, as “potentially revolutionary”).
14 See infra Section II.B.
15 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977).
16 See infra notes 190–193, 202.
17 See infra notes 178–182 and accompanying text.
18 Id.
10
11
12
13
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prejudice requirement might otherwise close. The door is cracked open by
Martinez v. Ryan, an equitable decision intended to sidestep procedural
default where unfairness, in the form of refusal to consider a substantial IAC
claim, would otherwise result.19 Where a petitioner invokes Martinez for
“cause” to excuse the default of a substantial IAC claim—that is, where he
demonstrates that his state initial-proceeding postconviction counsel was
ineﬀective for failing to raise the Batson-IAC claim—the habeas court should
presume prejudice.20 It should not demand the impossible.21
Part I outlines the problem and the Weaver solution in brief. Part II
mounts the argument that Weaver instructs courts to presume prejudice for
Batson-IAC claims. Part III advocates extending that presumption to
procedural default on habeas, in the circuits in which it is necessary, and
addresses objections. A conclusion follows.
I. THE PROBLEM, AND A SOLUTION, SKETCHED
Not all rights receive a remedy.22 In fact, in criminal cases, even
constitutional violations—which once required reversal of any conviction
they tainted23—might be left undisturbed on appeal if deemed “harmless.”
The harmless error doctrine24 permits a criminal conviction to stand if the
government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the guilty verdict was
unattributable to the error.25 Though harmless error doctrine inspires much
debate, the central idea is straightforward: not all errors, even constitutional
ones, demand an appellate remedy.26
The doctrine exempts some types of error, however, from harmless error
analysis. These errors, called “structural,” require appellate reversal without a
harmlessness determination.27 Structural errors differ from “trial” errors because
their harm evades calculation. A trial error, like mistakenly admitted evidence,
See generally Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012).
See id. at 14 (creating an exception to the procedural default bar where ineﬀective assistance
of postconviction counsel defaulted a substantial trial IAC claim, and where the state requires trial
IAC claims to be brought on collateral review); infra Section III.B.
21 See infra Section III.B.
22 Jeﬀries, Jr., supra note 1, at 87.
23 Martha S. Davis, Harmless Error in Federal Criminal and Habeas Jurisprudence: The Beast that
Swallowed the Constitution, 25 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 45, 49 (1999) (“For many years, a fairly clear
distinction was made between constitutional errors and nonconstitutional or statutory errors, with
constitutional errors considered presumptively prejudicial simply because of the nature of the right
of which the party was deprived.”).
24 The canonical constitutional harmless error case is Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
25 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993); see also Epps, supra note 2, at 2125.
26 Indeed, most do not receive one. See Epps, supra note 2, at 2120 n.2 (listing sources indicating
that the vast majority of errors are found to be harmless).
27 See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) (articulating how structural defects that affect
the framework of the trial, instead of errors in the trial itself, are not subject to harmless error analysis).
19
20
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causes practical damage that is, by hypothesis, easy enough to calculate; it has “a
definite, discrete and identifiable effect on the quantum of evidence presented
to the trier of fact.”28 By contrast, a structural error infects the trial from start to
finish, rendering it illegitimate in full rather than in part.29 A structural error—
like a biased judge,30 or a misleading reasonable doubt instruction31—
undermines the entire proceeding in a way that “def[ies] analysis by harmlesserror standards.”32 If demanded, a specific showing of harm would be practically
impossible; indeed, courts and scholars often define the category by the futility
of demonstrating prejudice.33 And although some structural errors undermine a
verdict’s reliability, that feature is generally thought irrelevant. Instead, as John
Blume and Stephen Garvey put it, the “nature of a structural error is to
undermine a reviewing court’s ability to evaluate with any precision the impact
of the error on the verdict.”34 Or, per Pamela Karlan: structural errors “so taint
the framework within which a trial proceeds that, in an important sense, there
has been no trial.”35 Because structural errors evade harmless error analysis, they
require automatic reversal.36
Though the Supreme Court has never oﬃcially held racial discrimination
in jury selection to be a structural error, it has always treated it as one, and
nearly every federal court to address the question has agreed.37 Where racial
Blume & Garvey, supra note 3, at 185.
See, e.g., Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017) (“[T]he deﬁning feature of a
structural error is that it ‘aﬀect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds,’ rather than being
‘simply an error in the trial process itself.’” (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310)).
30 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927).
31 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993).
32 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309 (internal quotation marks omitted).
33 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 734 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[I]f, as a
categorical matter, a court is capable of ﬁnding that the error caused prejudice upon reviewing the
record, then that class of errors is not structural.”).
34 Blume & Garvey, supra note 3, at 185.
35 Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV.
2001, 2018 (1998).
36 See, e.g., id. at 186-87 (“These rights can only be protected and enforced by shielding them
with a rule of automatic reversal.”).
37 See Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1911 (2017) (“This Court . . . has granted
automatic relief to defendants who prevailed on claims alleging race or gender discrimination in the
selection of the petit jury, though the Court has yet to label those errors structural in express terms.”
(citations omitted)); Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 161 (2009) (describing Batson as an “automatic
reversal precedent[]”); Crittenden v. Chappell, 804 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[I]t is well
established that a Batson [sic] violation is structural error.”); see also Eric L. Muller, Solving the
Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, 95
(1996) (“In keeping with its view that Batson error is serious business, the Supreme Court has
assumed, but never formally ruled, that the appropriate appellate remedy is automatic reversal of
the conviction.”); Jonathan Abel, Batson’s Appellate Appeal and Trial Tribulations, 118 COLUM. L.
REV. 713, 724 n.56 (2018) (citing cases to that eﬀect). This conclusion, which should be
uncontroversial, is bolstered by the Supreme Court’s holding that racial discrimination in grand jury
selection is a structural error. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 264 (1986). The Vasquez Court
28
29
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discrimination infects the jury selection process, a conviction cannot survive
appeal no matter the weight of the prosecution’s case. In other words, a Batson
violation is “structural error” that necessitates reversal on direct review.38 An
appellate court that ﬁnds a Batson violation will not conduct a futile harmless
error analysis to determine whether the violation aﬀected the trial outcome.
To do so would, as Jonathan Abel has put it, “mire” the court in the
“impossible question” of whether “the presence or absence of any particular
juror aﬀected the outcome.”39 Instead, the court vacates the conviction and
grants a new trial.40
A problem arises, however, where trial counsel failed to object to the
discriminatory jury selection. The “structural error” categorization dictates
reversal only where trial counsel objected, preserving the issue for appeal.41 But if
trial counsel remained silent, a state’s contemporaneous objection rule generally
precludes an appellate court from entertaining the Batson claim on direct appeal.42
By failing to raise the issue at trial, the defendant waived it altogether.43

itself based its decision on the similarity between grand and petit jury selection: “[W]hen a petit
jury has been selected upon improper criteria or has been exposed to prejudicial publicity, we have
required reversal of the conviction . . . . Like these fundamental ﬂaws, which never have been
thought harmless, discrimination in the grand jury undermines the structural integrity of the
criminal tribunal itself . . . .” Id. at 263-64; cf. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 n.3 (1986) (“The
basic principles prohibiting exclusion of persons from participation in jury service on account of
their race are essentially the same for grand juries and for petit juries.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Ford v. Norris, 67 F.3d 162, 170 (8th Cir. 1995) (“We ﬁnd no meaningful analytic
distinction between racial discrimination in composing the grand jury and racial discrimination in
selecting the petit jury.”). In fact, Eric Muller argues that the case for presuming prejudice is
stronger where discrimination has occurred in petit jury selection than in grand jury selection, given
the grand jury’s “subservien[ce]” to the prosecutor compared with the petit jury’s relative autonomy.
Muller, supra, at 112-13 n.131.
38 “Batson error” or “Batson violation” is generally used as shorthand for racial discrimination
in jury selection, and I use it in this way throughout this Comment. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 86
(holding that racial discrimination in jury selection violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause).
39 Abel, supra note 37, at 765.
40 See Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1903 (“[W]hen a structural error is objected to and then raised on
direct review, the defendant is entitled to relief without any inquiry into harm.”).
41 Id.
42 See Justin F. Marceau, Embracing a New Era of Ineﬀective Assistance of Counsel, 14 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1161, 1194 (2012) (“If . . . a defendant fails to raise a Batson violation prior to the
empanelment of the jury, the claim is almost universally deemed to have been forfeited or waived.”).
43 See, e.g., Ruﬀ v. Armontrout, 77 F.3d 265, 267-68 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that a failure to
object to the jury composition at trial constituted a waiver). This might be especially likely to happen
in the Batson context. An Equal Justice Initiative Report found that “[m]any defense lawyers fail to
adequately challenge racially discriminatory jury selection because they are uncomfortable,
unwilling, unprepared, or not trained to assert claims of racial bias.” EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE,
ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY 6 (2010),
https://eji.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/illegal-racial-discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R5PE-48CW].
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The Batson victim can revive the claim and vindicate his right to trial by
a properly selected jury by arguing on collateral (or “postconviction”) review
that his trial attorney provided ineﬀective assistance of counsel. By failing to
object when the prosecutor struck jurors on the basis of race, the defendant
contends, the trial attorney fell short of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of
eﬀective assistance of counsel.44
Strickland v. Washington governs a claim that trial counsel provided
constitutionally ineﬀective assistance.45 Strickland demands two showings:
ﬁrst, that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness (the “deﬁcient performance” prong) and, second, a
“reasonable probability” that the deﬁciency altered the trial’s outcome (the
“prejudice” prong).46 Though the two standards diﬀer,47 Strickland’s prejudice
prong exists for similar reasons as harmless error review, and some
commentators describe it as an “internal” harmless error test.48 Just as some
constitutional errors are harmless, the argument goes, so are some deﬁciencies
in representation. An attorney has not rendered constitutionally ineﬀective
assistance, then, unless the deﬁciency “prejudiced” the defendant.49
Despite the recognition that harmless error doctrine exempts a Batson
violation as structural, some federal circuits do not extend that solicitude to
44 Defense attorneys can themselves exercise peremptory strikes in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, as Batson does not apply to prosecutors alone. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S.
42, 59 (1992) (extending Batson to peremptory challenges by defense counsel). And Batson has a
gender-based parallel. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1994) (holding that
gender discrimination in jury selection is unconstitutional). Though an examination of prejudice in
these contexts would raise similar (but not identical) issues and is a worthy project, here I address
the paradigmatic Batson scenario in which the prosecutor strikes venire people on the basis of race.
45 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
46 Id. at 687.
47 In particular, the burden shifts. To establish an error as “harmless” on direct appeal, the
government must show that it was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). By contrast, a Strickland petitioner must “aﬃrmatively” show a “reasonable
probability” that, but for the error, the trial would have reached a diﬀerent result. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 693-94; see also David McCord, Is Death “Diﬀerent” for Purposes of Harmless Error Analysis?
Should It Be?: An Assessment of United States and Louisiana Supreme Court Case Law, 59 LA. L. REV.
1105, 1159 (1999) (describing the burden shift and the diﬀerence between the two tests).
48 See David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted
Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1253 (describing Strickland prejudice as “a kind of internal
harmless error doctrine”); Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV.
1, 51-52 (2002) (“Ineﬀective assistance claims . . . appear to incorporate harmless error analysis into
the substantive standard.”); McCord, supra note 47, at 1160 (“[T]he second half of the Strickland
test . . . contain[s] a camouﬂaged harmless error test . . . .”); Justin Murray, Prejudice-Based Rights in
Criminal Procedure, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 277, 296-97 (2020) (explaining that the Supreme Court and
scholars alike often treat harmless error and Strickland prejudice as interchangeable).
49 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. As Professor Anthony Amsterdam put it, “[N]o ‘Ouch,’ no
constitutional rights violation.” Anthony G. Amsterdam, Remarks, Investiture of Eric M. Freedman
as the Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, November 22, 2004, 33 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 403, 408 (2004).
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Strickland’s prejudice prong. Even when trial counsel provided concededly
deﬁcient assistance in failing to object to discriminatory jury selection, these
courts demand a showing of prejudice: not only that a Batson objection likely
would have succeeded, but also that a fairly selected jury likely would have
arrived at a diﬀerent verdict (or, in capital cases, sentence).50 This is, as some
courts themselves recognize, an impossible task.51
These circuits insulate Batson-based IAC claims from appellate remedy.
Because a petitioner will fail to demonstrate that he suﬀered prejudice from
a structural error, a successful showing that racial discrimination infected jury
selection means nothing if brought in the context of an IAC claim.
Other circuits employ, I suggest, a much more sensible scheme. These
circuits presume prejudice so long as the defendant has shown a reasonable
probability that a Batson objection, if made at trial, would have prevailed,
resulting in a trial by a fairly selected jury.52
50 See, e.g., Young v. Bowersox, 161 F.3d 1159, 1160-61 (8th Cir. 1998) (rejecting a Batson-based
Strickland claim because petitioner “[could not] satisfy the prejudice requirement and [did] not
attempt[] to do so”); Virgil v. Dretke, 446 F.3d 598, 607 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e do not hold that a
structural error alone is suﬃcient to warrant a presumption of prejudice in the ineﬀective assistance
of counsel context . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Ashley C. Harrington, Note, Batson versus Strickland:
Evaluating Ineﬀective Assistance of Counsel Claims Resulting from the Failure to Object to Race-Based
Peremptory Challenges, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1006, 1026-27 nn.84-86 (2014) (collecting cases and
outlining the circuit split); Amy Knight Burns, Note, Insurmountable Obstacles: Structural Errors,
Procedural Default, and Ineﬀective Assistance, 64 STAN. L. REV. 727, 757-59 (2012) (same).
51 See Young, 161 F.3d at 1160-61 (acknowledging that its ruling placed the petitioner in the
“impossible position of showing how the outcome of the trial would have been diﬀerent in the
absence of a structural defect”); Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 65 (1st Cir. 2007) (“We will
not ask defendants to do what the Supreme Court has said is impossible.”); Vansickel v. White, 166
F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 1999) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (“Without explaining how . . . any . . .
litigant could possibly make such a showing, the majority . . . overrides our well established rule that
prejudice as to the result need not, indeed cannot, be shown in jury composition cases. By doing so,
it renders it virtually impossible for any defendant to vindicate his right to due process if his attorney
has committed a procedural default in such a case.”).
52 See, e.g., Winston v. Boatwright, 649 F.3d 618, 632 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Prejudice, in other words,
is automatically present when the selection of a petit jury has been infected with a violation of Batson
or J.E.B.”); Davis v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 341 F.3d 1310, 1317 (11th Cir. 2003) (establishing
that where there is a “reasonable probability” that a Batson challenge would have prevailed on appeal
had trial counsel preserved it, appellant has demonstrated prejudice). But see Purvis v. Crosby, 451
F.3d 734, 739 (11th Cir. 2006) (narrowing Davis to apply only where trial counsel raised a Batson
challenge but failed to preserve it for appeal, noting, “those are not the words we used in Davis, but
it is what we meant”). At least one circuit even has what one might think of as an intra-circuit split.
The Eighth Circuit generally presumes Strickland prejudice for structural error but not for a Batson
error, without acknowledging Batson’s default status as a structural error. Compare McGurk v.
Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470, 475 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e hold that when counsel’s deﬁcient performance
causes a structural error, we will assume prejudice under Strickland.”), with Young, 161 F.3d at 1160-61
(declining to presume Strickland prejudice for Batson errors). The two cases, decided six days apart,
have created a divergence between Batson and non-Batson structural errors—which is especially
unfortunate since the Young panel mistakenly considered itself “controlled” by Wright v. Nix, a Swain
v. Alabama—not Batson—case that did not reach prejudice. See Young, 161 F.3d at 1161; Wright v. Nix,
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In 2017, the Supreme Court provided guidance on this circuit split in the
context of a diﬀerent structural error.53 Weaver v. Massachusetts addressed
whether courts should presume Strickland prejudice where the alleged
ineﬀectiveness was counsel’s failure to object to an improper courtroom
closure during jury selection.54 Like a Batson violation, a violation of the right
to a public trial is structural error.55 But the Court declined to aﬀord that
status any “talismanic signiﬁcance,” instead cabining structural error, as a
category, to the direct appeal context.56 In an IAC claim, the Court explained,
what matters is not whether a type of error is structural, but the reason it is
structural.57 The Court suggested that errors that are structural because they
“always result[] in fundamental unfairness” should be exempt from a
Strickland prejudice analysis.58 Because a public trial violation during jury
selection does not always result in fundamental unfairness, a petitioner must
take the normal route to Strickland relief, no matter how challenging: He must
demonstrate that the courtroom closure caused him prejudice.59
The open-courtroom-during-jury-selection right failed Weaver’s test.60
But some lower courts have read the case to preclude relief for IAC claims
resulting from a failure to raise any structural error at trial.61 This is a mistake.

928 F.2d 270, 272 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)); Burns, supra note
50, at 760 n.137 (noting that Young’s lone support, Wright, “never reached the question of prejudice
and opined on the matter only in dicta”). Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit has stuck to its guns. See,
e.g., United States v. Kehoe, 712 F.3d 1251, 1255 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[W]hether defense counsel’s decision
to select the jury in a racially discriminatory manner should result in a presumption of prejudice is
a question that is foreclosed by our holding in Young.”); United States v. Lee, 715 F.3d 215, 223 (8th
Cir. 2013) (acknowledging that Young conﬂicts with Seventh and Eleventh Circuit law but ﬁnding
no prejudice because “[t]he record evidence does not show that any of the jurors who served were
biased by trial counsel’s decision to strike Caucasian venire members”); Strong v. Roper, No. 4:08CV1917,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69910, at *16 (E.D. Mo. June 29, 2011) (citing Young and finding no prejudice
where “qualified venirepersons were excluded from jury service” on the basis of religion).
53 See Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017) (“There is disagreement among
the Federal Courts . . . about whether a defendant must demonstrate prejudice in a case like this
one—in which a structural error is neither preserved nor raised on direct review but is raised later
via a claim alleging ineﬀective assistance of counsel.”).
54 Id. at 1906-07, 1910-11.
55 Id. 1908.
56 Id. at 1910; see also Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 129-30 (2011) (“Fulminante says nothing
about prejudice for Strickland purposes . . . .”).
57 Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 1911.
60 Id. at 1910-13.
61 See, e.g., Parks v. Chapman, 815 F. App’x 937, 944 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Weaver stands for the
idea that ﬁnality and judicial economy can trump even structural error; so, when a defendant raises
a structural error on collateral review rather than on direct review, he must prove actual
prejudice . . . .”); Carter v. Laﬂer, No. 17-1409, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 27968, at *10 (6th Cir. Aug.
30, 2017) (denying petitioner’s request to presume prejudice for procedural default purposes for a
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The Court’s reasoning, taken seriously, widens the availability of IAC relief
because it detaches Strickland prejudice from counterfactual trial outcome. It
instructs courts to presume prejudice for constitutional errors that result in
fundamental unfairness—even unfairness that does not undermine the
verdict’s factual reliability. One such error, I suggest, is Batson.62 When a
petitioner seeks postconviction relief on the grounds that their trial attorney
provided ineﬀective assistance of counsel by failing to object to
discriminatory jury selection, Weaver instructs that they need demonstrate
only deﬁcient performance.63 Just as on direct appeal, prejudice is presumed.
But presuming Strickland prejudice does not solve the impossibility
problem in full. A convicted person whose attorneys failed to raise the BatsonIAC claim timely in state court may turn to federal habeas corpus review. If

structural error because “[t]he Supreme Court has since decided Weaver, and the holding of Weaver
is unavailing for [petitioner]”).
62 I tend to believe that Batson error does undermine reliability, but, as I explain below, current
doctrine mostly forecloses that approach. But see John C. Jeﬀries Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineﬀective
Assistance and Procedural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 717 (1990)
(suggesting that racial discrimination in jury selection may “tend to undermine the accuracy of
determinations of guilt, at least in close cases” on the grounds that, “in a general way, the Batson rule
is designed to secure just outcomes, not merely to deter misconduct that is otherwise
objectionable”); Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Eﬀects of
Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 99 (1993) (concluding that juror race “can and
does aﬀect jury decisions”); Tanya E. Coke, Note, Lady Justice May Be Blind, But Is She a Soul Sister?
Race-Neutrality and the Ideal of Representative Juries, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 327, 349 (1994) (“[T]he Court
has been constrained to disclaim any connection between race and juror perspective in a given case.
One is hard pressed to imagine that the Court really believes this, since the public obviously does
not.”); Hollis v. Davis, 941 F.2d 1471, 1482 (11th Cir. 1991) (“In Strickland terms, if we compared the
result reached by an all white jury, selected by systematic exclusion of blacks, with the result which
would have been reached by a racially mixed jury, we would have greater conﬁdence in the latter
outcome, ﬁnding much less probability that racial bias had aﬀected it.”).
63 Though it exceeds the scope of this Comment, I assume that trial counsel performs deficiently
if she waives a Batson objection that would have prevailed, at trial or on appeal. See, e.g., Mitcham v.
Davis, 103 F. Supp. 3d 1091, 1108 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that a failure to raise a meritorious Wheeler
objection—California’s Batson analog—constituted deficient performance). Even if the objection was
overruled at trial, counsel may have been ineffective for failing to preserve it for appeal. See Roe v.
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000) (“[W]hen counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance
deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken, the defendant has made out a
successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim entitling him to an appeal.”); Burns v. Gammon, 260
F.3d 892, 898 (8th Cir. 2001) (“But for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of either the trial or
the later appeals would likely have been different, and [the defendant] can therefore establish that
counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense.”); Williams v. Lockhart, 849 F.2d 1134, 1137
n.3 (8th Cir. 1988) (“[D]eficient attorney performance in perfecting an appeal is prejudicial under . . .
Strickland.”); Shaw v. Dwyer, 555 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1009 (E.D. Mo. 2008) (“The denial of meaningful
direct appeal has long been held to amount to prejudice under Strickland. . . . A defendant has been
denied effective assistance of counsel when counsel’s error, mistake, or omission effectively deprives
the defendant of a fair appellate review of his conviction.”).
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the state courts relied on state procedural rules to refuse to hear a claim, the
procedural default doctrine precludes federal habeas review.64
Procedural default features its own, analytically distinct, prejudice
requirement: a federal habeas court will excuse procedural default if the
petitioner shows “cause” for failure to present a claim to the state courts and
“actual prejudice” resulting from the underlying error.65 This prejudice showing
will evade Batson victims in federal habeas much as it did in state proceedings.
A number of factors complicate Weaver’s application to federal habeas
review. For one, Weaver reached the Supreme Court in an odd procedural
posture, on direct appeal from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s
denial of petitioner’s motion for a new trial.66 It presented the Court no
opportunity to address the more common scenario in which federal courts
address Strickland prejudice: habeas petitioners seeking relief from state
sentences.67 Second, habeas’s federalism implications add complexity to the
otherwise pure Strickland question. As Amy Knight Burns has pointed out,
Strickland prejudice and procedural default prejudice need not be identical,
despite the verbal similarity, and despite courts’ propensity to collapse
them.68 Thus, an argument for presuming prejudice in one context might not
persuade in the other.
64 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (reasoning that concern for federalism,
comity, and ﬁnality precludes federal habeas review after a litigant defaulted on their claims pursuant
to state procedures); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977) (holding that a failure to
challenge a defendant’s confession at trial according to state procedural rules precludes federal
habeas review).
65 Sykes, 433 U.S. at 84-85, 87. I refer colloquially to this prejudice standard as “Sykes prejudice.”
66 Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1906-07. Lower courts have differed on how to characterize Weaver’s
procedural posture. Compare Williams v. Burt, 949 F.3d 966, 978 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Weaver was a direct
review case.”), with Report and Recommendation at 39 n.4, Lewis v. Sorber, No. 18-1576 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 1, 2021) (“Weaver has been described as having been decided on direct, rather than collateral,
review. I would not characterize the case in that way.” (citation omitted)). Regardless, it did not arise
on traditional habeas corpus review. One scholar describes Weaver as a “direct-collateral-review case.”
Z. Payvand Ahdout, Direct Collateral Review, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 159, 191 (2021).
67 Cf. NANCY J. KING, FRED L. CHEESMAN II & BRIAN J. OSTROM, FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT:
HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES
FILED BY STATE PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT
OF 1996 (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY) 5 (2007), https://www.ojp.gov/pdﬃles1/nij/grants/219558.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EH7A-LN52] (ﬁnding that 81 percent of capital and 50.4 percent of non-capital
federal habeas petitions challenging state court convictions raised IAC claims).
68 See Burns, supra note 50, at 748 (“The prejudice inquiry of Strickland is . . . analytically
distinct from the prejudice inquiry in Sykes.”); Zinzer v. Iowa, 60 F.3d 1296, 1299 n.7 (8th Cir. 1995)
(“We note that the ‘prejudice’ component of ‘cause and prejudice’ is analytically distinct from the
Strickland prejudice we examined above.”); Jackson v. Herring, 42 F.3d 1350, 1361 (11th Cir. 1995)
(“[W]e bear in mind that the prejudice prong of Strickland is not co-terminous with the more general
prejudice requirement of Wainwright v. Sykes . . . .”). But see Ambrose v. Booker, 801 F.3d 567, 578
(6th Cir. 2015) (“The ‘actual prejudice’ inquiry [for procedural default purposes] was intended to
mirror the inquiry required by Strickland . . . .”); Burns, supra, at 748 (“While these two requirements
are technically separate, and need not use the same standard, most courts evaluating such claims
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I advocate the extension of Weaver’s presumption of prejudice to the
procedural default context in at least one set of circumstances. In Martinez v.
Ryan, the Supreme Court created an equitable exception to the procedural
default bar where ineﬀective assistance of postconviction counsel caused the
default of a substantial trial IAC claim, in states that require trial IAC claims
to be brought on collateral, rather than direct, review.69 Under Martinez,
ineﬀective assistance of postconviction counsel provides “cause” to excuse the
default; Weaver should provide “prejudice.” In some circuits—ones that do
not demand a distinct prejudice showing of petitioners proceeding under
Martinez—this extension will be unnecessary.70 In others,71 it means the
diﬀerence between dismissal on procedural grounds and a federal forum for
the constitutional claim.
The case for presuming prejudice in the Martinez context is fairly
straightforward. Martinez was an equitable decision that aimed to guarantee
a habeas petitioner one “full and fair review of his constitutional claims, either
in state or federal court,” even if it meant sweeping aside procedural bars.72
Insisting on an impossible demonstration of “actual prejudice” after a
petitioner successfully invokes Martinez to supply “cause” insulates
meritorious Batson claims from review at any level.73 That insistence would
impose an impossible-to-meet procedural bar to a defaulted Batson-IAC
claim. It would contravene Martinez’s core commitment.
Presuming prejudice in the procedural default context is both the fair and
eﬃcient thing to do. Rather than twist itself in knots determining whether it
can hear a claim at all, a federal habeas court should look straight to the
merits.74 The eﬃciency argument holds special weight given the posture in

have collapsed them, holding that a satisfaction of the Strickland standard satisﬁes the Sykes prejudice
inquiry, or vice versa.”).
69 Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9, 14 (2012).
70 See infra notes 190–193.
71 See infra note 202.
72 Justin F. Marceau, Is Guilt Dispositive? Federal Habeas After Martinez, 55 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2071, 2131 (2014). Marceau has described Martinez as the culmination of the “new era of federal
habeas” dedicated to proceduralism. Id. at 2132, 2136-37; see also Eve Brensike Primus, Equitable
Gateways: Toward Expanded Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State-Court Criminal Convictions, 61
ARIZ. L. REV. 291, 321 (2019) (“[O]ne important overarching goal of federal habeas review is to
ensure that prisoners have one full and fair chance to have their federal claims considered.”).
73 Even courts demanding such a showing have acknowledged as much. See, e.g., Young v.
Bowersox, 161 F.3d 1159, 1160-61 (8th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging that its ruling placed the petitioner
in the “impossible position of showing how the outcome of the trial would have been diﬀerent in
the absence of a structural defect”). These courts should not be so indiﬀerent in the wake of Martinez
and Weaver.
74 Cf. Amsterdam, supra note 49, at 409 (“[Habeas procedure is] intricately labyrinthine, and
so confusing that courts today devote ten times as much labor, intelligence, and prose to deciding
whether they can hear a convicted person’s constitutional claims at all as they devote to considering
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which such claims will generally reach a federal court on habeas; where
Martinez supplies cause, the procedural default analysis also provides answers
for the underlying IAC and Batson claims. The habeas labyrinth collapses into
one question: did trial counsel perform deﬁciently by failing to raise a
meritorious Batson objection? Where the answer is “yes,” state postconviction
counsel was similarly ineﬀective for failing to raise the trial IAC claim, so
Martinez supplies “cause” for procedural default purposes.75 And again, where
the answer is “yes,” a federal court should presume prejudice for both
Strickland and procedural default purposes.
Academic literature and courts alike have mostly overlooked Weaver’s
potential implications.76 A number of academic works have identiﬁed Batson’s
problematic application to Strickland.77 A 2012 note by Amy Knight Burns
skillfully explicated the interaction between IAC and procedural default, with
particular attention to Batson-related diﬃculties.78 But the few articles and
cases to address Weaver since it came down in 2017 have mostly focused on its
(important) implications for Strickland doctrine, without reference to any
potential habeas consequences.79 If anybody has grappled with Weaver’s

the merits of such claims.”); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 758-59 (1991) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (describing procedural default doctrine as “a Byzantine morass”).
75 A petitioner need not have had counsel in state postconviction proceedings for Martinez to
attach, so I use “state postconviction counsel” loosely to include pro se litigants. See Marceau, supra
note 72, at 2143 n.343.
76 Cf. Eve Brensike Primus & Justin Murray, Redefining Strickland Prejudice after Weaver v.
Massachusetts, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (May 22, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/redeﬁningstrickland-prejudice-after-weaver-v-massachusetts [https://perma.cc/FDE2-NXSY] (“Weaver has
gone largely unnoticed by both the defense bar and academics outside the context of public-trial
violations—an oversight we hope to see corrected.”). Professors Primus and Murray, along with
Susan Yorke, see infra note 113, are notable exceptions to the general academic dismissal of Weaver.
77 See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 50, at 1010-12 (mentioning the circuit split and articulating
why a demonstration of Strickland prejudice is “complex and onerous”—and perhaps impossible
without “heav[y] rel[iance] on racialized assumptions”—in the Batson context); Abel, supra note 37,
at 765 (“Forcing a defendant to show prejudice to show prejudice would . . . mire the doctrine in the
impossible question of demonstrating that the presence or absence of any particular juror aﬀected
the outcome.”).
78 Burns, supra note 50, at 728-30.
79 See Primus & Murray, supra note 76 (“Although Weaver lost his claim, the majority’s
willingness to entertain expansion of Strickland’s prejudice test to include a fundamental unfairness
inquiry—separate from the traditional focus on whether deﬁcient performance aﬀected the
outcome—represents an important doctrinal shift.”); Primus, supra note 13, at 1648 (“Justin Murray
and I have proposed that, after Weaver, criminal defendants should argue (and courts should
recognize) that an attorney’s episodic deﬁcient performance is ‘prejudicial when counsel’s errors
rendered the trial process fundamentally unfair’ even if those errors probably did not alter the trial’s
outcome.”); see also Brooks v. Gilmore, No. 15-5659, 2017 WL 3475475, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2017)
(presuming Strickland prejudice for a faulty reasonable doubt instruction because Weaver “carv[es]
out an exception” to, rather than supplants, the general rule that courts presume Strickland prejudice
for structural errors).
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procedural default implications, no consensus has emerged and the argument
remains rare.80 But let’s begin with Strickland.
II. WEAVER AND THE CASE FOR PRESUMING STRICKLAND PREJUDICE
FOR BATSON ERROR
Weaver shifted Strickland’s thrust away from outcome and toward fairness.
A structural error causes prejudice, Weaver held, if the error “always results
in fundamental unfairness.”81 This is a categorical, not case-by-case, inquiry:
the question is whether the error is of the sort that always causes fundamental
unfairness. Because racially discriminatory jury selection always causes
fundamental unfairness, courts should not demand an impossible prejudice
demonstration before granting Strickland relief.
A. Weaver’s Shift
Strickland’s prejudice inquiry generally focuses on the trial’s likely result
absent the error that constituted deﬁcient performance. The classic Strickland
formulation requires an appellant to show a reasonable probability that, “but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been diﬀerent.”82 It thus demands an “outcome-based” determination: the
question is not whether an error occurred, or (as on harmless error review)
whether that error contributed to the conviction.83 Instead, the question is
whether, absent the error, the verdict would have been diﬀerent.
As Eve Brensike Primus and Justin Murray have argued, Weaver shifts
Strickland prejudice away from a focus on counterfactual outcome.84 After

80 The Sixth Circuit addressed and dismissed an argument that Weaver instructs that
procedural default prejudice should be presumed for IAC claims resulting from the failure to object
to a fair-cross-section violation. See Parks v. Chapman, 815 F. App’x 937, 944-45 (6th Cir. 2020)
(“Weaver does not support [defendant’s] contention that he need not prove actual prejudice solely
because a fair-cross-section violation is structural error.”). A concurring judge acknowledged in a
footnote that “[t]here may be substantial merit” to the argument but declined to adopt it. See id. at
954 n.13 (Donald, J., concurring in the judgment).
81 Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (2017).
82 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1983).
83 See Blume & Garvey, supra note 3, at 180 (contrasting the prevailing “outcome-focused”
Strickland approach favored by Chief Justice Rehnquist with Justice Stevens’s “error-focused approach”).
84 Primus & Murray, supra note 76. Primus and Murray speak in terms of “reliability,” but I
think “outcome-based” is more accurate, since errors that changed a trial’s outcome generally satisfy
Strickland prejudice, even if they made the outcome more factually reliable. See King, supra note 62,
at 122 (“[P]rejudice tests provide relief for violations of both ‘truth-obstructing’ rights . . . and
‘truth-furthering’ rights.”).
It would be an oversimpliﬁcation to suggest that Weaver singlehandedly introduced a new
understanding of Strickland prejudice. Writing in 2012, ﬁve years before Weaver, Justin Marceau
highlighted the longstanding “divergent understandings” of Strickland prejudice: a reliability-based
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Weaver, courts should presume prejudice whenever a defendant demonstrates
that their counsel’s deﬁcient performance resulted in a structural error that
always causes fundamental unfairness. In Section II.B., I argue that the
failure to object to racial discrimination in jury selection is such an error. But
ﬁrst let’s solidify our understanding of Weaver.
Writing for the Court in Weaver, Justice Kennedy began by noting the
federal circuit and state high court split as to “whether a defendant must
demonstrate prejudice in a case like this one—in which structural error is
neither preserved nor raised on direct review but is raised later via a claim
alleging ineﬀective assistance of counsel.”85 The Court withheld a categorical
“yes” or “no”; instead, it decided that some types of structural error demand
a showing of actual prejudice to prevail on an IAC claim, while suggesting
that others do not.86 Diﬀerent errors are structural for diﬀerent reasons, the
Court explained, and “the reasons an error is deemed structural may inﬂuence
the proper standard used to evaluate an ineﬀective-assistance claim premised
on the failure to object to that error.”87
The Court identified three general categories of structural error. The first,
which includes the right to conduct one’s own defense, “is not designed to
protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead protects some
other interest.”88 These rights are structural—and therefore exempt from
harmless error analysis on direct review—because “harm is irrelevant” to
them.89 The second category is structural purely because of the impossibility
one that would “preclude claims of pretrial ineﬀective assistance of counsel when the reliability of
the trial is not in doubt,” and a fairness-based one:
[I]nsofar as the right to counsel is conceived of as protecting a fairness that is distinct
from, and in addition to, the reliability of the jury’s guilt determination and the
fairness of the trial itself, there is good reason to conclude that convictions secured on
the basis of pretrial constitutional deﬁciencies caused by the errors of defense counsel
are constitutionally unsound.
Marceau, supra note 42, at 1170 (footnote omitted). As Marceau notes, the fairness-focused inquiry
would countenance IAC claims based on a failure to raise a Batson objection, while the reliabilityfocused inquiry would not. Id. In this way, we might understand Weaver as continuing, or clarifying,
prior fairness-focused decisions like Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 368-69, 387 (1986), where
the Court held that a lawyer can provide constitutionally ineﬀective counsel by failing to exclude
reliable evidence of guilt, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 388 (2010), where the Court held the
same for an attorney’s failure to advise a client of the collateral deportation risks of a guilty plea,
and, I would add, Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 60 (1985), where the Court deﬁned Strickland
prejudice in the guilty plea context by reference to the likelihood that the defendant would have
proceeded to trial absent the faulty advice, but not to whether he would have prevailed at trial. See
Marceau, supra note 42, at 1176-82.
85 Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017).
86 Id. at 1907-08.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1908.
89 Id.
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of ascertaining the precise harm caused. Since on direct review the burden of
showing harmlessness lies with the government,90 impossibility weighs in the
defendant’s favor: “Because the government will . . . find it almost impossible
to show that the error was ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,’ the efficiency
costs of letting the government try to make the showing are unjustified.”91 The
Court offered the denial of the right to select one’s own attorney as this sort
of structural error.92 Finally, some errors are structural because they “always
result[] in fundamental unfairness.”93 These errors include the denial of the
right to an attorney and a misleading reasonable-doubt jury instruction.94
Only the final category—errors that are structural because they always result
in fundamental unfairness—merits a presumption of Strickland prejudice.95
The Court noted that these categories are “not rigid” and may overlap;
some errors may be structural for multiple reasons.96 Thus, an error’s presence
in multiple categories does not preclude it from a presumption of prejudice.
But “one point is critical: An error can count as structural even if the error
does not lead to fundamental unfairness in every case.”97 Only an error that
always results in fundamental unfairness merits the presumption.
With this foundation laid, the Court turned to the structural error at
hand: the violation of the right to an open courtroom during jury selection.
To determine whether to presume Strickland prejudice or to demand its
demonstration, the Court asked “whether a public-trial violation counts as
structural because it always leads to fundamental unfairness or for some other
reason.”98 A few considerations convinced the Court that a public trial
violation does not always lead to fundamental unfairness. First, since the
Constitution permits courtroom closure during jury selection in some
circumstances, the right “is subject to exceptions,” which “suggests that not
every public-trial violation results in fundamental unfairness.”99 Second, the
Court explained that the right is structural for reasons other than
90 This contrasts with the IAC context, where the petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating
prejudice. See supra note 47.
91 Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908 (citation omitted).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 See id. (ﬁrst citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963), and then citing
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)).
95 Id. (“[T]he question is whether a . . . violation counts as structural because it always leads to
fundamental unfairness or for some other reason.”).
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 1909. I must admit to doubts. The fact that a courtroom may sometimes be closed to
the public constitutionally says nothing about whether it is fundamentally unfair when it is done
unconstitutionally. Nonetheless, I intend to take the Weaver Court at its word and apply the decision
to Batson error, rather than challenge Weaver (itself a worthy undertaking).
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fundamental unfairness; for instance, the Court’s previous discussions of the
right centered on the “diﬃculty of assessing the eﬀect of the error” rather
than the unfairness it causes.100 Finally, though the Court conceded that the
public trial right protects the accused, it noted that it “also protects some
interests that do not belong to the defendant,” namely access to courts for the
public and press.101 Taken together, those considerations “conﬁrm the
conclusion the Court now reaches that, while the public-trial right is
important for fundamental reasons, in some cases an unlawful closure might
take place and yet the trial will still be fundamentally fair from the
defendant’s standpoint.”102 And it concluded that in the speciﬁc case at issue,
the violation did not cause fundamental unfairness because it “did not
pervade the whole trial.”103
Some courts have read Weaver to demand a showing of prejudice
whenever a petitioner alleges IAC resulting in any structural error. For
instance, the Sixth Circuit has characterized Weaver as announcing as a
categorical matter “that prejudice is not presumed in cases involving claims
of ineﬀective assistance of counsel that result in structural error[].”104 This is
wrong. Most straightforwardly, it is wrong because the Court explicitly
cabined its decision, emphasizing that Weaver resolves the disagreement
about presuming prejudice “speciﬁcally and only in the context of trial
counsel’s failure to object to the closure of the courtroom during jury
selection.”105 It leaves treatment of other structural errors for future cases, and
lends guidance—in the form of the fundamental unfairness inquiry—to lower
and future courts.
It is also wrong because it confuses what the Weaver Court held with what
it assumed. The Sixth Circuit interpreted Weaver to assume the “fundamental
unfairness” possibility arguendo but not to decide whether it exists.106 It is
true that Weaver did not decide that a defendant seeking IAC relief can show
100 Id. at 1910 (ﬁrst citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149 n.4 (2006), and
then citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984)).
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 1913.
104 Carter v. Lafler, No. 17-1409, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 27968, at *10 (6th Cir. Aug. 30, 2017);
see also Parks v. Chapman, 815 F. App’x 937, 944 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Weaver stands for the idea that
finality and judicial economy can trump even structural error; so, when a defendant raises a structural
error on collateral review rather than on direct review, he must prove actual prejudice . . . .”).
105 Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1907.
106 Wellborn v. Berguis, No. 17-2076, 2018 WL 4372196, at *2 (6th Cir. May 16, 2018) (“After
Weaver, [Wellborn] contends, a petitioner can show Strickland prejudice by establishing either the
reasonable probability of a diﬀerent outcome or fundamental unfairness. Not so. The Court in
Weaver assumed, for analytical purposes only, that the petitioner could show Strickland prejudice by
establishing that counsel’s errors rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. The Court did not,
however, decide whether this interpretation was correct.” (citation omitted)).
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either actual prejudice or fundamental unfairness resulting from the speciﬁc
error at hand. It simply assumed the possibility “for [] analytical purposes.”107
But Weaver addressed two distinct “fundamental unfairness” inquiries and
attached the “assumption” disclaimer only to one. The ﬁrst is categorical and
focuses on the type of error: whether “a public-trial violation counts as
structural because it always leads to fundamental unfairness or for some other
reason.”108 The other is particular and focuses on the speciﬁc instance of the
error: whether, in this case, “the convicted person shows that attorney errors
rendered the trial fundamentally unfair . . . .”109 Though the Court could have
done a better job distinguishing the two, it eventually became clear that they
are independent questions:
[N]ot every public-trial violation will in fact lead to a fundamentally unfair
trial. Nor can it be said that the failure to object to a public-trial violation
always deprives the defendant of a reasonable probability of a diﬀerent
outcome. Thus, when a defendant raises a public-trial violation via an
ineﬀective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Strickland prejudice is not shown
automatically. Instead, the burden is on the defendant to show either a
reasonable probability of a diﬀerent outcome in his or her case or, as the
Court has assumed for these purposes, to show that the particular public-trial
violation was so serious as to render his or her trial fundamentally unfair.110

The Court applied the “assumption” disclaimer only to the particular
argument, not the categorical one. While Weaver implicitly opened the door
to speciﬁc fundamental unfairness claims,111 it explicitly opened the door to

107 Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1911 (“Petitioner . . . argues that under a proper interpretation of
Strickland, even if there is no showing of a reasonable probability of a diﬀerent outcome, relief still
must be granted if the convicted person shows that attorney errors rendered the trial fundamentally
unfair. For the analytical purposes of this case, the Court will assume that petitioner’s interpretation
of Strickland is the correct one. In light of the Court’s ultimate holding, however, the Court need not
decide that question here.”).
108 Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908 (emphasis added).
109 Id. at 1911.
110 Id. (citations omitted).
111 Eve Brensike Primus has been the most forceful advocate of this approach. See Primus, supra
note 13, at 1648-49 (arguing that under Weaver, Strickland petitioners need only show “that the
proceedings were fundamentally unfair,” regardless of the right’s categorical status); Primus &
Murray, supra note 76 (arguing that people who suﬀer from a public-trial violation, which Weaver
decided does not always cause fundamental unfairness, should nonetheless argue that the violation
at hand rendered their trial fundamentally unfair). At least one court has assumed this argument’s
viability. See United States v. Aguiar, 894 F.3d 351, 356 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (relying on Weaver to deny
an IAC claim based on failure to object to a voir dire courtroom closure because petitioner oﬀered
no evidence that the closure caused a diﬀerent outcome “or that the voir dire proceedings were
fundamentally unfair”).
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categorical fundamental unfairness claims.112 It is diﬃcult to read the decision
any other way: in determining whether to presume prejudice, “the question
is whether a public-trial violation counts as structural because it always leads
to fundamental unfairness or for some other reason.”113
To recap, the Weaver Court held that 1) an IAC claim based on trial counsel’s
failure to object to a public-trial-in-jury-selection right demands a showing of
actual prejudice because not every violation of the right causes fundamental
unfairness; 2) not every such violation causes fundamental unfairness because
the right is subject to exceptions, discussions of its structural status have
focused on the impossibility of harm calculation rather than the omnipresence
of harm, and it protects rights other than the defendant’s.
B. Applying Weaver to Batson
Every Batson violation is fundamentally unfair to the defendant. The
Weaver Court nearly acknowledged as much by listing Batson, its sister

112 Professor Primus advocates this approach as well. See Primus & Murray, supra note 76 (“For
Batson violations and other errors that qualify as structural on the ground that they always result in
fundamental unfairness, defendants should argue based on Weaver that a ﬁnding of deﬁcient
performance stemming from a failure to object to these structural errors causes prejudice per se as a
matter of federal (and possibly state) constitutional law.”).
113 Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908; see also Report and Recommendation at 38, Lewis v. Sorber, No.
18-1576 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2021) (“[Weaver] reads very much like a holding that a showing of
fundamental unfairness would have entitled petitioner to a new trial.”); Susan Yorke, Jury
Nullification Instructions as Structural Error, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1441, 1464, 1466 (2020) (explaining
that after Weaver’s “much-needed guidance,” when an error “is raised through an ineﬀective
assistance of counsel claim in federal habeas proceedings, the availability of automatic reversal
depends on whether the error at issue in fact rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. . . . Only those
that satisfy the third rationale—fundamental unfairness—result in automatic reversal in contexts
other than direct appellate review” (footnote omitted)). The signiﬁcance of the “fundamental
unfairness” language did not escape Justices Thomas and Alito, who wrote separate concurrences,
both joined by Justice Gorsuch, denouncing that portion of the opinion. See Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at
1914 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Because the Court concludes that the closure during petitioner’s
jury selection did not lead to fundamental unfairness in any event, no part of the discussion about
fundamental unfairness is necessary to its result.” (citations omitted)); id. at 1915 (Alito, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (lamenting the majority’s focus on fundamental fairness rather than
reliability). But the majority opinion commanded the votes of four justices who joined no skeptical
concurrences, and the two dissenters—Justices Breyer and Kagan—would surely agree that prejudice
can be presumed for structural errors resulting in fundamental unfairness, since they would presume
prejudice for all structural errors. See id. at 1917-18 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[J]ust as structural errors
are categorically insusceptible to harmless-error analysis on direct review, so too are they
categorically insusceptible to actual-prejudice analysis in Strickland claims. A showing that an
attorney’s constitutionally deﬁcient performance produced a structural error should consequently be
enough to entitle a defendant to relief.”). I thank Daniel Silverman for alerting me to the Lewis v.
Sorber case and for providing the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation.
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J.E.B.,114 and its cousin Vasquez115 as structural errors that categorically “cause
fundamental unfairness, either to the defendant in the speciﬁc case or by
pervasive undermining of the systemic requirements of a fair and open
judicial process.”116 But that comment addressed direct appeal, not IAC on
collateral review.117 And the quote’s second part—“or by pervasive
undermining of the systemic requirements of a fair and open judicial
process”—carves out the possibility that Batson errors do not always lead to
fundamental unfairness for Strickland purposes. We know because the Weaver
Court considered the public trial right’s protection of public and press access
irrelevant to the Strickland prejudice analysis. Instead, the fundamental
unfairness inquiry must be conducted “from the defendant’s standpoint.”118 If
Batson error is publicly, but not personally, unfair, Weaver does not demand
that Strickland prejudice be presumed. According to Weaver, Strickland is
indiﬀerent to extra-defendant harms, including those to jurors. To merit a
presumption of prejudice, Batson needs to protect defendants—not jurors or
the system—from fundamental unfairness.
Thus, Batson errors will merit a presumption of Strickland prejudice only
if they 1) always render a trial fundamentally unfair 2) to the defendant.
It is not obvious that they do. Batson is generally thought to protect, as
Eric Muller has described it, “a package of equal protection rights: rights of
the defendant to a fair trial free of the stigma of racial prejudice, and rights
of prospective jurors both to be free of that stigma and to participate fully in
the criminal justice system.”119
Even worse, it is not altogether clear, as a doctrinal matter, that a
defendant suﬀers any concrete harm from racially discriminatory jury
selection. Muller calls this the “Batson paradox.”120 Rather than the superior
reliability of a racially representative jury, or the impact that race might have
on a juror’s view of the criminal legal system and therefore their propensity
to convict or acquit, Batson rested its holding on race blindness. Whereas pre114 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (extending Batson to claims of
gender discrimination).
115 Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1986) (holding that racial discrimination in grand
jury selection is structural error).
116 Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1911.
117 See id. at 1911-12 (“The errors in those cases necessitated automatic reversal after they were
preserved and then raised on direct appeal. And this opinion does not address whether the result should
be any different if the errors were raised instead in an ineffective-assistance claim on collateral review.”).
118 Id. at 1910.
119 Muller, supra note 37, at 95; see also Abel, supra note 37, at 716 (“Batson was the Court’s
oﬃcial acknowledgement that discrimination in jury selection was an assault on defendant, juror,
and justice alike.”); Coke, supra note 62, at 338 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s jury discrimination cases
display considerable ambivalence as to just where the constitutional harm of race-conscious jury
selection inures.”).
120 Muller, supra note 37, at 96.
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Batson decisions “stated openly what . . . seemed obvious: the racial
composition of a black person’s jury could well aﬀect the verdict in his or her
case,”121 after Batson, “[r]ace and gender became not just impermissible but
ﬂatly irrational predictors of juror perspective.”122 But if race is irrelevant, the
exclusion of members of a given race from jury service cannot possibly impact
a verdict. Batson thus “managed the incoherent task of creating a type of error
that is, by deﬁnition, harmless in every case.”123
Despite the Batson paradox, the Court has continued to assume that Batson
errors require reversal on direct appeal. Still, the paradox might present an
additional challenge in this context, since extra-defendant harms may be
relevant on direct appeal but not on collateral review of an IAC claim.
Another reason to worry: the Court in Allen v. Hardy held that Batson did not
apply retroactively on collateral review, in part because, though Batson
protects “a criminal defendant’s interest in neutral jury selection procedures,”
a violation does not have “such a fundamental impact on the integrity of
factﬁnding as to compel retroactive application.”124 Does Allen suggest that
Batson error causes no fundamental unfairness?
1. Batson Violations Cause Unfairness to Defendants
Whatever extra-defendant harm a Batson violation causes, the Supreme
Court has been clear that it causes a defendant some harm as well. As recently
as 2019, the Court wrote that “Batson sought to protect the rights of defendants”125

Coke, supra note 62, at 339.
Muller, supra note 37, at 101; see also id. at 102 (“In Edmonson, the Court said more clearly
what it had hinted at in Batson: Classiﬁcations based on race are not just impermissible as a matter
of law but are also irrational as a matter of fact.”). Not all members of the Court insisted on
colorblindness: perhaps ironically, the conservative justices, who wished to do away with Batson
altogether, thought it silly. As Muller recounts:
121
122

By the time of J.E.B., the dissenters were openly and stridently endorsing the theory
of diﬀerence. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated categorically that “[t]he two sexes diﬀer,
both biologically and, to a diminishing extent, in experience.” “It is not merely
‘stereotyping,’” he continued, “to say that these diﬀerences may produce a diﬀerence
in outlook which is brought to the jury room.” Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief
Justice and Justice Thomas, mocked Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion for its
“fervent defense of the proposition il n’y a pas de diﬀérence entre les hommes et les femmes.”
Justice O’Connor said it most simply of all: “We know that like race, gender matters.”
Id. at 104 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
123 Id. at 96.
124 Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 259 (1986) (per curiam).
125 Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2242 (2019) (“Batson sought to protect the rights of
defendants and jurors, and to enhance public conﬁdence in the fairness of the criminal justice system.”
(emphasis added)).
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and in 2005 it wrote that “[d]efendants are harmed, of course,” when they suffer
a Batson violation.126 Similar language pervades discussions elsewhere.127
Besides, a defendant would lack standing to raise a Batson claim at all if
racially discriminatory jury selection caused him no harm.128 For comparison, in
the Fourth Amendment context, somebody convicted using evidence obtained
in violation of a third party’s constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure lacks standing to invoke the exclusionary rule.129 Because “Fourth
Amendment rights are personal rights that may not be asserted vicariously,” a
defendant may not challenge the introduction of unconstitutionally obtained
evidence unless he himself suffered the violation.130
If the Court believed that Batson violations do not harm defendants, it
would deny standing in a similar fashion.131 The Court sometimes resorts to
vicarious standing in Batson cases, but it has only felt the need to address the
issue where the defendant and struck juror are of diﬀerent races.132 By
implication, where the prosecutor strikes venirepeople of the defendant’s
race, the defendant has traditional standing and need not invoke that of a
third party.133 Further, even vicarious standing requires that the person
invoking it suﬀer cognizable injury, a requirement the defendant in Powers

Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 237 (2005).
See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991) (“The discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges by the prosecution causes a criminal defendant cognizable injury.”); Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (“[T]he State denies a black defendant equal protection of the laws when it
puts him on trial before a jury from which members of his race have been purposefully excluded.”).
This was clear to the Court even pre-Batson. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiﬀ, 407 U.S. 493, 504 (1972) (plurality
opinion) (recognizing the “strong interest of the criminal defendant in avoiding [the] harm” that is
“latent in an unconstitutional [racially discriminatory] jury-selection system”).
128 Justice Thomas—but only Justice Thomas—has pointed to the Batson paradox to advocate
for denying Batson victims standing to challenge racial discrimination in their jury selection. Flowers,
139 S. Ct. at 2270 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Flowers should not have standing to assert the excluded
juror’s claim[] . . . [because he] has suﬀered no legally cognizable injury.”). Justice Gorsuch joined
the rest of Justice Thomas’ dissent but pointedly left his name oﬀ of this part. Id. at 2252.
129 See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
130 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133; see also Payner, 447 U.S at 731-32 (“[R]espondent lacks standing under
the Fourth Amendment to suppress the documents illegally seized from [a third party].”).
131 Cf. Coke, supra note 62, at 342 (“If, in fact, the principal harm of peremptory abuse inures
to jurors, one wonders why it should be that defendant beneﬁts from a new trial when an appellate
court ﬁnds a Batson violation and reverses the conviction.”).
132 See Powers, 499 U.S. at 409, 415 (holding that a white defendant may object to the
prosecution’s peremptory challenges of Black venirepersons under Batson because he has standing to
object to the violation of the juror’s right “not to be excluded from [a jury] on account of race”).
133 The inference did not escape Justice Scalia in dissent. Id. at 423 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In
an apparent attempt to portray the question before us as a novel one, the Court devotes a large
portion of its opinion to third-party standing—as though that obvious avenue of rendering the Equal
Protection Clause applicable had not occurred to us in the many [prior] cases.”).
126
127
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satisﬁed because racial discrimination in jury selection “places the fairness of
a criminal proceeding in doubt.”134
So the defendant suﬀers some harm, in the form of unfairness, when his
jury is selected in a discriminatory manner. The questions remain whether
that unfairness is “fundamental,” and whether it occurs “in every case”
infected with Batson error.135
2. Batson Violations Cause That Unfairness “In Every Case”
Unlike a public trial violation, Batson allows no exceptions. Indeed,
Batson’s absoluteness marked the fundamental shift from the pre- to postBatson era. Under Swain v. Alabama, Batson’s predecessor, a defendant had to
show that a prosecutor had systematically discriminated “in case after case”
to sustain a claim.136 Batson rejected Swain’s permissiveness and made clear
that one “single invidiously discriminatory governmental act” of racial
discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause.137 The Court reiterated
the same in 2019: “In the eyes of the Constitution, one racially discriminatory
peremptory strike is one too many.”138 Whereas a judge may close a courtroom
without violating the Constitution, the Constitution never permits a lawyer
to exercise a peremptory strike based on race. Whatever harm results from
racially discriminatory jury selection, it results “in every case.”139
3. Batson Violations Cause Fundamental Unfairness
Both jury and race implicate notions of fundamental fairness in the U.S.
legal system in a way that few other concepts do. In holding that the jury trial
is inherent to due process, the Supreme Court celebrated the right to trial by
jury as “fundamental to the American scheme of justice”140 and an
“inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and

134 Id. at 411 (majority opinion) (explaining that in order to invoke third party standing a
litigant must have “suﬀered ‘an injury in fact,’ thus giving him or her a ‘suﬃciently concrete interest’
in the outcome of the issue in dispute,” and holding that the white defendant in the case had suﬀered
such an injury because of the doubt discrimination casts on the integrity and fairness of the criminal
proceeding); see also id. at 404 (“[A] defendant has . . . the right to be tried by a jury whose members
are selected by nondiscriminatory criteria.” (citation omitted)).
135 Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (2017).
136 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223 (1965).
137 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986); see also Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228,
2241 (2019) (“[T]he Batson Court rejected Swain’s insistence that a defendant demonstrate a history
of racially discriminatory strikes in order to make out a claim of race discrimination.”).
138 Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2241.
139 Cf. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908.
140 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the right to trial by jury against the states).
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against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.”141 More recently, it called
the jury “a central foundation of our justice system and our democracy” and
“a fundamental safeguard of individual liberty,” essential to “fair and impartial
verdicts.”142 An exhaustive account of the lofty language the right to a jury
has inspired is unnecessary to drive home the point: the jury protects
fundamental fairness.
The Court has been particularly concerned with eliminating racial bias
from juries and has decided that the Constitution requires unique procedural
steps to accomplish that goal. For instance, the Court decided in PeñaRodriguez that the Constitution required a racial bias exception to the deeply
rooted common law and statutory rule forbidding jurors from testifying about
jury deliberations.143 No constitutionally mandated exception had ever been
found—not even for inebriated or explicitly biased jurors—and only the
“gravest and most important cases” would require one.144 Racial animus in the
jury room rose to that level. The Court cited the “particular threat” that
“racial discrimination in the jury system pose[s]” to “the integrity of the jury
trial”;145 a history of “[a]ll-white juries punish[ing] black defendants
particularly harshly;”146 and the jury’s role as “a criminal defendant’s
fundamental ‘protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice.’”147
In all, the “unique historical, constitutional, and institutional concerns”
implicated by racial bias in the criminal jury meant that the Sixth
Amendment required an exception to the “no-impeachment” rule.148
And the unfairness that racially discriminatory jury selection causes does not
dissipate once a jury is empaneled. A Batson violation infects all the proceedings
that follow. The Powers Court explained a Batson violation’s impact:
A prosecutor’s wrongful exclusion of a juror by a race-based peremptory
challenge is a constitutional violation committed in open court at the outset
of the proceedings. The overt wrong, often apparent to the entire jury panel,
casts doubt over the obligation of the parties, the jury, and indeed the court
to adhere to the law throughout the trial of the cause. . . . The inﬂuence of
the voir dire process may persist throughout the whole course of the trial

141 Id. at 156. The Court cited Blackstone, who extolled the requirement that “every
accusation . . . should afterwards be conﬁrmed by the unanimous suﬀrage of twelve of his equals
and neighbours, indiﬀerently chosen and superior to all suspicion.” Id. at 151-52 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 349 (Cooley ed. 1899)).
142 Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 860-61 (2017).
143 Id. at 863, 869.
144 Id. at 865-66 (citing United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 366 (1852)).
145 Id. at 867.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 868.
148 Id. at 868, 869.
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proceedings. . . . The composition of the trier of fact itself is called in
question, and the irregularity may pervade all the proceedings that follow.149

Few things are quite so fundamentally unfair as permitting the “especially
pernicious”150 inﬂuence of racial discrimination to shape the factﬁnding body,
let alone the defendant’s, jurors’, and public’s view of the proceedings. And
whereas race-blind equal protection jurisprudence insists that jurors are
racially fungible in terms of factual reliability,151 it does not insist that a trial
tainted with racial discrimination from the outset can be “fair” in a more
general sense—just the opposite.152 The discrimination undermines the
fairness of the tribunal and indicates that similar constitutional disdain may
persist throughout the trial. These consequences must amount to
fundamental unfairness.153
It is true that Allen v. Hardy concluded that Batson should not apply
retroactively to ﬁnal convictions because a violation has no “fundamental
impact on the integrity of factﬁnding.”154 But factﬁnding accuracy and
fairness are distinct concepts. While the defendant, and not just the public,
must experience the fundamental unfairness, the unfairness need not go to
factﬁnding reliability; an error that undermines reliability can simply be
analyzed under the classic “actual prejudice” standard, without resort to the
“fundamental unfairness” inquiry. In this way, Weaver detaches prejudice
from outcome and permits a focus on a more expansive notion of the fairness
we may demand from our criminal legal system. Surely that fairness includes
jury selection uncontaminated by racism.
The unique importance of race and jury has not been entirely lost on
jurists considering whether racial discrimination in jury formation causes
fundamental unfairness. Faced with the argument that Weaver requires a
presumption of prejudice where the ineﬀective assistance of counsel resulted
from a failure to object to a racially unrepresentative jury pool, the Sixth
149 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412-13 (1991) (citations omitted); see also id. at 411 (“The jury
acts as a vital check against the wrongful exercise of power by the State and its prosecutors. The
intrusion of racial discrimination into the jury selection process damages both the fact and the
perception of this guarantee.” (citation omitted)).
150 Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868.
151 See Coke, supra note 62, at 349 (“[T]he Court has been constrained to disclaim any
connection between race and juror perspective in a given case. One is hard pressed to imagine that
the Court really believes this, since the public obviously does not.”).
152 Cf. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (“For racial discrimination to result in the
exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualiﬁed groups not only violates our Constitution and the
laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a
representative government.” (footnote omitted)).
153 Accord Abel, supra note 37, at 758 (“Batson violations . . . undermine the fairness of the jury
verdicts on which everything else relies.”).
154 Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 259 (1986).
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Circuit’s Judge Bernice Donald concluded in a concurring opinion that a
racially unrepresentative jury pool “fails to provide the impartiality necessary
to sustain a judicial system” and therefore “involv[es] a greater level of
fundamental unfairness” than the temporary courtroom closure in Weaver.155
But the argument has not yet prevailed.
Recall the Weaver Court’s reasons for concluding that public trial violations
do not cause fundamental unfairness in every case: the right is subject to
exceptions, discussions of its structural status focus on the impossibility of
harmless error calculation rather than the omnipresence of harm, and it
protects rights other than the defendant’s.156 As explained above, Batson
permits no exceptions. The other two reasons, however, do apply to Batson: its
harm evades definition, and its protection extends beyond the defendant.157
That should not cause worry. Weaver was quite clear that its structural
error categories overlap, and that “more than one of [the] rationales may be
part of the explanation for why an error is deemed to be structural.”158 And
because structural errors by deﬁnition defy harm calculation, every structural
error shares this trait.159 So long as an error always causes fundamental
unfairness, Weaver demands the presumption of prejudice, even if the error
is also impossible to quantify and extends beyond the defendant.
Furthermore, the right to courtroom access during jury selection may
have been a uniquely poor candidate to pass Weaver’s test. The right is
undeniably important.160 But, as a formal matter, it has no impact on the trial’s
substance.161 Unlike many structural errors, including racially discriminatory
jury selection, it does not shape the factﬁnding body. It is thus both more
155 Parks v. Chapman, 815 F. App’x 937, 954 n.13 (6th Cir. 2020) (Donald, J., concurring in the
judgment). Judge Donald believed that the argument that Weaver’s fundamental unfairness analysis
should excuse a prejudice showing for a fair cross-section jury claim had “substantial merit,” but
concluded that the panel could not overrule circuit precedent absent a Supreme Court opinion on
point or a decision of the circuit sitting en banc. Id.
156 See supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text.
157 See, e.g., Muller, supra note 37, at 95 (“The Batson ‘right’ is actually a package of equal
protection rights: rights of the defendant to a fair trial free of the stigma of racial prejudice, and
rights of prospective jurors both to be free of that stigma and to participate fully in the criminal
justice system. . . . Where it is the defendant who is injured by the discrimination, the Court may
believe that the eﬀects of the injury are so diﬀuse as to make harmless error analysis impossible.”);
Abel, supra note 37, at 765.
158 Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (2017).
159 See supra notes 27–36; Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1907-08.
160 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial . . . .”).
161 But see Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 2173, 2176 (2014) (arguing that the criminal court audience “can and should be a central
constitutional mechanism for popular accountability in modern criminal justice” in part because
“audiences aﬀect the behavior of government actors inside the courtroom, helping to deﬁne the
proceedings through their presence”).
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external to the defendant and more nebulous in its harm than a Batson
violation. Indeed, of the commonly cited structural errors—the right to an
unbiased judge,162 to self-representation,163 to an accurate reasonable-doubt
jury instruction,164 and more—the right to an open courtroom during voir
dire is perhaps the least likely to pass Weaver’s test.
Not so for racial discrimination in jury selection: since Batson error always
causes fundamental unfairness, it merits a presumption of prejudice.
III. HABEAS IMPLICATIONS: EXCUSING PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
Federal habeas relief is exceedingly rare,165 so Part II’s proposal might make
the most difference in state postconviction proceedings. Still, states’ pervasive
underfunding of public defense166 and the difficulty of complying with state
habeas preservation and exhaustion requirements167 means that many claims
are not timely raised in state court and can only be vindicated in federal court,
where they “run head-on” into habeas’s procedural default bar.168
A habeas petitioner can overcome procedural default by showing “cause”
for the failure to raise a claim in state court and “actual prejudice” suffered as
a result of the claimed violation.169 The latter requirement may sound familiar.
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927).
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149 n.4 (2006).
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993).
See Nancy J. King, Non-Capital Habeas Cases After Appellate Review: An Empirical Analysis,
24 FED. SENT’G REP. 308, 310 (2012) (estimating that just 0.8% of non-capital federal habeas
petitioners receive relief).
166 See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After
Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2153 (2013) (“[M]ost states, counties and
municipalities . . . have refused to provide funding necessary for counsel and equal justice, despite
repeated reports of deﬁcient representation and gross miscarriages of justice.”); BRYAN FURST,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., A FAIR FIGHT: ACHIEVING INDIGENT DEFENSE RESOURCE PARITY
2 (2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/ﬁles/2019-09/Report_A%20Fair%20Fight.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3PWU-LJKK] (“At the heart of defender resource disparity is the chronic
underfunding of indigent defense . . . .”).
167 See, e.g., Thomas C. O’Bryant, The Great Unobtainable Writ: Indigent Pro Se Litigation After
the Antiterrorism and Eﬀective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 307-33
(2006) (outlining the numerous obstacles incarcerated people face in litigating their state and federal
postconviction claims from prison).
168 Eve Brensike Primus, Eﬀective Trial Counsel After Martinez v. Ryan: Focusing on the Adequacy
of State Procedures, 122 YALE L.J. 2604, 2609 (2013) (“[T]he ﬁrst realistic opportunity that most
defendants have to raise an ineﬀective assistance of trial counsel claim is on collateral review.
However, most states do not provide defendants with the assistance of eﬀective counsel for
postconviction review. As a result, many defendants fail to preserve their ineﬀective assistance of
trial counsel claims in state court and face procedural defaults when they attempt to challenge the
eﬀectiveness of their trial attorneys in federal habeas proceedings.”); cf. Marceau, supra note 72, at
2114 (“Procedural default is one of the most common barriers to relief in modern habeas practice.”).
169 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 280
(2012); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167 (1982).
162
163
164
165
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This Part explores one path past procedural default: the one Martinez v.
Ryan carved in 2012. Martinez permits ineﬀective assistance of postconviction
counsel to serve as “cause” to excuse the procedural default of a “substantial”
ineﬀective-assistance-of-trial-counsel (IATC) claim. Martinez is of particular
interest here because it instructs habeas courts to prioritize fairness and
pragmatism over formal procedural barriers to IAC claims.170 Martinez’s focus
on procedural fairness makes it a good candidate to recognize the absurdity
of turning away habeas petitioners who cannot make the impossible
demonstration that a Batson violation caused their convictions. Where
Martinez supplies cause to revive a Batson-IAC claim, I argue, courts should
presume actual prejudice.
*

*

*

Somebody seeking to challenge a state conviction must exhaust his state
court remedies before turning to federal habeas.171 Accordingly, the federal
court will refuse to consider any claim not presented to the state courts. If
the state courts invoked an “independent and adequate” state procedural
ground to refuse to hear a claim, the federal court considers the claim
“procedurally defaulted” and refuses to hear it.172
A narrow exception provides hope to habeas petitioners whose claims the
state courts ignored on procedural grounds. The Supreme Court has
instructed federal courts sitting in habeas to excuse procedural default—and
therefore reach a claim’s merits—where the petitioner shows cause and actual
prejudice: roughly speaking, an external reason for the failure to timely
present a claim in state court (cause), and harm suﬀered as a result of the
underlying violation of federal law (actual prejudice).173 I refer to this
requirement as the “Sykes standard”—embracing “Sykes cause” and “Sykes
prejudice”—after Wainwright v. Sykes.174
Courts facing procedurally defaulted IAC claims on habeas often collapse
the two prejudice inquiries,175 and as a result a similar circuit split plagues the
See infra notes 216–224.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982) (holding that federal
habeas petitioners bringing both exhausted and unexhausted claims must either drop unexhausted
claims or return to state court to assert them).
172 Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732.
173 Id. at 750.
174 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977). This is interchangeable with the “Coleman
standard,” after Coleman, 501 U.S. at 722, which adopted Sykes’s standard to all habeas contexts. Id.
at 750.
175 See, e.g., Ambrose v. Booker, 801 F.3d 567, 577-78 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that a petitioner
must show Strickland prejudice to excuse procedural default); Johnson v. Sherry, 586 F.3d 439, 447
n.7 (6th Cir. 2009) (collapsing the two prejudice inquiries), abrogated by Weaver v. Massachusetts,
170
171
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presumption of prejudice for procedural default as for Strickland, to the extent
courts recognize the issue at all.176
But, despite the parallel language, Strickland prejudice and Sykes prejudice
need not mirror each other. Strickland and Sykes prejudice are “analytically
distinct.”177 They diﬀer mainly in their origin and therefore their ﬂexibility:
one is constitutional and the other prudential.178 Whereas Strickland
interprets the Sixth Amendment’s requirements, Sykes simply represents the
Court’s attempt to weigh the petitioner’s interest in habeas review against
respect for federalism, comity, and ﬁnality.179 These diﬀerences might help or
hinder attempts to bypass procedural default. On the one hand, Sykes’s basis
in federalism has led some courts to require a more convincing showing of
Sykes than Strickland prejudice.180 On the other, those same prudential origins
grant the Court ﬂexibility in fashioning a fair Sykes prejudice doctrine.
Because procedural default does not deprive a federal habeas court of
jurisdiction,181 the procedural default question is not whether a federal court
137 S. Ct. 1989 (2017); Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953, 958 (same); Owens v. United States, 483
F.3d 48, 64 n.13 (1st Cir. 2017) (“Owens must make two showings of prejudice. First, Owens must
show that counsel’s failure to object to the trial closure prejudiced him for the purposes of
determining whether there was ineﬀective assistance of counsel. Second, Owens must also show
prejudice to excuse his procedural default on the public trial claim. We believe that these two
showings of prejudice overlap, and we resolve them simultaneously.” (citations omitted)), abrogated
by Weaver, 137 S. Ct. 1989.
176 Zinzer v. Iowa, 60 F.3d 1296, 1299 n.7 (8th Cir. 1995) (“The ‘actual prejudice’ required to
overcome the procedural bar must be a higher standard than the Strickland prejudice required to
establish the underlying claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.”); United States v. Dale, 140 F.3d
1054, 1056 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“It is not clear whether the showing of prejudice required to cure
procedural default is identical to—or greater than—the showing required to establish ineffective
assistance of counsel . . . .”); Burns, supra note 50, at 756-58 (explaining the split in the Strickland
context, and noting that few courts acknowledge the potential difference). The Eighth Circuit has
recognized that different panels of its court have reached different conclusions—another illustration
that these distinctions often go unnoticed. See Armstrong v. Kemna, 590 F.3d 592, 606 (8th Cir. 2010).
177 Burns, supra note 50, at 748; see also Zinzer, 60 F.3d at 1299 n.7 (“We note that the ‘prejudice’
component of ‘cause and prejudice’ is analytically distinct from the Strickland prejudice we examined
above.”); Jackson v. Herring, 42 F.3d 1350, 1361 (11th Cir. 1995). But see Ambrose, 801 F.3d at 578
(“The ‘actual prejudice’ inquiry [for procedural default purposes] was intended to mirror the inquiry
required by Strickland . . . .” (citations omitted)).
178 See, e.g., Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392-93 (2004) (“[W]hile an adequate and
independent state procedural disposition strips this Court of certiorari jurisdiction to review a state
court’s judgment, it provides only a strong prudential reason, grounded in ‘considerations of comity
and concerns for the orderly administration of criminal justice,’ not to pass upon a defaulted
constitutional claim presented for federal habeas review.”).
179 Strickland is ﬂexible, too; the decision itself warned that it did not “establish mechanical
rules,” and instead encouraged an “ultimate focus . . . on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984). Still, its standards deﬁne the contours of a
constitutional right, while Sykes merely aims at comity and ﬁnality. See infra note 181.
180 Supra note 176.
181 See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 83 (1977) (noting that procedural default is “a
matter of comity but not of federal power”).
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sitting in habeas may hear a claim that the state court refused to hear, but
whether it should.182
In Martinez v. Ryan, the Court exercised that ﬂexibility to excuse the
procedural default of a new class of claims. Traditionally, attorney error that
does not violate the constitutional guarantee to eﬀective counsel cannot
provide cause for procedural default.183 And because the Constitution does
not guarantee an attorney in postconviction proceedings, a postconviction
attorney’s deﬁciencies cannot trigger constitutional concern and therefore
cannot serve as cause.184
Martinez created an exception to that rule.185 Martinez and its progeny held
that in states that require—as a legal or practical matter186—appellants to raise
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on collateral review rather than
direct appeal, ineffective assistance of initial-review postconviction counsel
can serve as “cause” to excuse procedural default that would otherwise bar
federal review of a “substantial” trial IAC claim.187 Martinez relied on the
intuition that a state should not be able to shield trial counsel’s ineffectiveness
from federal review by moving ineffective-assistance claims from direct appeal
(where an appellant enjoys a constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel) to postconviction proceedings (where he does not).188
182 See, e.g., Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 538-39 (1976) (“There can be no question of a
federal district court’s power to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in a case such as
this. The issue . . . goes rather to the appropriate exercise of that power.” (citation omitted);
McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 402-03 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he doctrine of
procedural default . . . is not a statutory or jurisdictional command; rather, it is a ‘prudential’ rule
‘grounded in considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of criminal
justice.’ And what courts have created, courts can modify.” (citations omitted)); Martinez v. Ryan,
566 U.S. 1, 13 (2013) (“The rules for when a prisoner may establish cause to excuse a procedural
default are elaborated in the exercise of the Court’s discretion.”); Dretke, 541 U.S. at 397 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (“The Court’s . . . determination in this case rests entirely on a procedural rule of its
own invention. But having also invented the complex jurisprudence that requires a prisoner to
establish ‘cause and prejudice’ as a basis for overcoming procedural default, the Court
unquestionably has the authority to recognize a narrow exception . . . .”); cf. Burns, supra note 50, at
750 (“[T]he Supreme Court seems to suggest that in a clash, the procedural default rule ought to
yield. . . . [J]ustice trumps comity.”).
183 See generally Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
184 Id. at 757 (“Because Coleman had no right to counsel to pursue his appeal in state habeas,
any attorney error that led to the default of Coleman’s claims in state court cannot constitute cause
to excuse the default in federal habeas.”).
185 Martinez, 566 U.S. at 9.
186 See Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 417 (2013) (extending Martinez to states that technically
permit appellants to raise IAC claims on direct appeal, but whose “system[s] in actual operation . . .
make it ‘virtually impossible’” to do so).
187 Martinez, 566 U.S. at 7, 9; see also Marceau, supra note 72, at 2136-37 (“The Supreme
Court . . . establish[ed] an exception to Coleman: ‘Inadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review
collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineﬀective
assistance at trial.’”).
188 Martinez, 566 U.S. at 13.
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Martinez is susceptible to two readings and has accordingly generated a
relevant circuit split.189 Under the ﬁrst reading, Sykes prejudice eﬀectively
disappears. Under the second, it remains—but it should not, I argue, bar
consideration of a Batson-IAC claim.
A. Reading No. 1: Cause Subsumes Prejudice
One interpretation—prevalent in, for instance, the Third,190 Fourth,191
Seventh,192 and Ninth Circuits193—holds that Martinez covers both Sykes
prongs: cause and actual prejudice. Where this approach prevails, no
prejudice issue arises.
In these circuits, the analysis proceeds as follows. To establish cause, a
petitioner must show that postconviction counsel was ineﬀective under
Strickland’s standards.194 This, in turn, requires demonstrating a)
postconviction counsel’s deﬁcient performance; and b) a reasonable
probability that, absent the deﬁcient performance, postconviction
proceedings would have reached a diﬀerent result.195 Both of those inquiries
turn on the strength of the underlying IATC claim.
Here is where these circuits’ analysis diverges from the alternative: Sykes
cause subsumes Sykes prejudice. To establish Sykes prejudice, the petitioner
must “demonstrate that the underlying ineﬀective-assistance-of-trial-counsel
claim is a substantial one, which is to say that . . . the claim has some merit.”196
This “substantial” claim inquiry displaces the traditional prejudice inquiry.

See infra notes 190–193, 202.
Workman v. Superintendent, Albion SCI, 915 F.3d 928, 939 (3d Cir. 2019); Preston v.
Superintendent, Graterford SCI, 902 F.3d 365, 376-77 (3d Cir. 2018).
191 Fowler v. Joyner, 753 F.3d 446, 461 (4th Cir. 2014).
192 Brown v. Brown, 847 F.3d 502, 513 (7th Cir. 2017).
193 Ramirez v. Ryan, 937 F.3d 1230, 1241 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. Shinn v. Ramirez,
141 S. Ct. 2620 (2021) (granting certiorari on a different issue); Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 362, 377
(9th Cir. 2014), overruled on other grounds by McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
194 Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 14 (2013). The petitioner can also show that the state simply
failed to provide him with postconviction counsel, forcing him to proceed pro se. Note that the
failure to appoint postconviction counsel is not a constitutional violation. But, in Martinez’s words,
it “is not without consequences for the State’s ability to assert a procedural default in later
proceedings.” Id. at 13. Regardless, this route is fairly straightforward, so I focus on the ineﬀectiveassistance-of-postconviction-counsel route.
195 See Ramirez, 937 F.3d at 1241 (laying out this analysis); Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 377 (same).
196 Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14; accord Ramirez, 937 F.3d at 1241 (“The analysis of whether both
cause and prejudice are established under Martinez will necessarily overlap, ‘since each considers the
strength and validity of the underlying ineﬀective assistance claim.’” (quoting Djerf v. Ryan, 931
F.3d 870, 880 (9th Cir. 2019))).
189
190
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This Russian nesting doll of ineﬀectiveness bears diagramming:

The habeas labyrinth is no longer so labyrinthine. Each obstacle simply
demands a diﬀerent level of conﬁdence in the IATC claim’s strength. Once a
petitioner has shown that his postconviction counsel performed deﬁciently by
omitting a meritorious IATC claim, he has necessarily shown 1) a “reasonable
probability” of a successful IATC claim and 2) the existence of a “substantial”
IATC claim—one with “some merit.” And, since (as I argue) Weaver instructs
us to presume prejudice resulting from a failure to raise a Batson objection,
the only remaining question is whether a meritorious Batson objection existed
at trial—that is, whether racial discrimination infected jury selection.197
On this telling, Sykes cause subsumes Sykes prejudice. Thus the Ninth
Circuit has concluded that if a petitioner has established cause under
Martinez—in the form of postconviction counsel’s deﬁcient performance and
resulting prejudice—“he will necessarily have established that there is at least

197 Though it exceeds the scope of this Comment, I assume that the failure to raise a
meritorious Batson objection at trial constitutes deﬁcient performance. See supra note 63. This may
not always be true if, for instance, counsel had some strategic reason for the waiver. See Mitcham v.
Davis, 103 F. Supp. 1091, 1108 (N.D. Cal. 2015). But see Parks v. Chapman, 815 F. App’x 937, 946 (6th
Cir. 2020) (Donald, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[B]ecause even a strategic decision to forgo
challenging the discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge nevertheless fails to provide the
defendant with a fair trial, I would hold that the failure to raise a meritorious Batson challenge is
outside the range of reasonable trial strategy.”). It may also not be true if the factual basis for the
Batson claim emerged post-trial and therefore trial counsel could not have known its viability.
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‘some merit’ to his claim that he suﬀered ineﬀective assistance of trial
counsel,”198 and he has therefore established prejudice as well.
To be sure, Martinez contains language that supports this interpretation.
After Martinez lays out the formula for establishing cause, it continues: “To
overcome the default, a prisoner must also demonstrate that the underlying
ineﬀective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one . . . .”199
Because “overcom[ing] the default” requires both cause and prejudice, that
phrasing seems to imply that the “substantial” IATC claim alone will satisfy
prejudice. Plus, the opinion says that where ineﬀective assistance of
postconviction counsel caused the procedural default of a substantial IATC
claim, procedural default “will not bar” a federal habeas court from hearing
it.200 This language once again supports the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation.
And the Court continued its opaque language in its subsequent decision in
Trevino v. Thaler, where it explained that Martinez created an exception
“allowing a federal habeas court to ﬁnd ‘cause,’ thereby excusing a procedural
default”—implying that Martinez may disappear the Sykes prejudice
requirement altogether.201
B. Reading No. 2: Presuming Prejudice (Again)
But Martinez arguably lends itself more easily to a diﬀerent
interpretation, one that leaves the “prejudice” obstacle in a petitioner’s path.
On this reading, which the Sixth Circuit has adopted,202 Martinez supplies
cause, but says nothing about prejudice.
On its own terms, Martinez addressed the question “whether there is cause
for an apparent default”203 and held that the petitioner could use his
postconviction attorney’s ineﬀectiveness “to establish ‘cause.’”204 Even more
tellingly, the Court instructed the lower court on remand to consider cause
and prejudice separately: “[T]he Court of Appeals did not determine whether
Martinez’s attorney in his ﬁrst collateral proceeding was ineﬀective or
Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 382.
Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14.
Id. at 17.
Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 423 (2013).
See Atkins v. Holloway, 792 F.3d 654, 660 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that a petitioner
establishes cause by demonstrating postconviction counsel’s ineﬀectiveness and the existence of a
substantial IATC claim, and that the court may not address the claim’s merits without an additional
prejudice showing); Woolbright v. Crews, 791 F.3d 628, 637 (6th Cir. 2015) (same). Judge Nguyen
in the Ninth Circuit has advocated this same approach. See Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1260-61
(9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Nguyen, J., concurring) (“I disagree that Martinez modiﬁes the prejudice
showings required to establish ineﬀective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, and
to overcome a procedural default under Coleman v. Thompson.” (citations omitted)).
203 Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
204 Id. at 17.
198
199
200
201
202
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whether his claim of ineﬀective assistance of trial counsel is substantial. And
the court did not address the question of prejudice. These issues remain open
for a decision on remand.”205 The instruction to investigate prejudice would
make no sense if the “substantial IATC claim,” which is necessary to the
ﬁnding of cause, automatically satisﬁed prejudice as well.206
On this reading, a second prejudice analysis remains: the court must
determine whether the petitioner was prejudiced, for Sykes purposes, by his
trial counsel’s ineﬀective assistance—that is, by his trial counsel’s failure to
object to racially discriminatory jury selection. Martinez’s substantiality
requirement becomes internal to the Sykes cause analysis, and Sykes prejudice
remains unchanged: the petitioner must show that “the errors at his trial . . .
worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial
with error of constitutional dimensions.”207
The key point here is that a court could logically (if not, in my view,
wisely) presume that the petitioner was prejudiced for Strickland purposes—
satisfying the procedural default cause prong—without indulging the same
presumption for Sykes purposes—obstructing the procedural default prejudice
prong. Many courts treat Strickland and Sykes prejudice identically,208 and a
court that does so will likely either presume both—if it adopts my reading of
Weaver—or presume neither, if it does not. But a court may opt to analyze
the two prejudice inquiries separately.
The Sixth Circuit, for instance, followed this path in Jones v. Bell, in which
it presumed Strickland prejudice for a structural error but then held that
“[h]abeas petitioners must additionally show ‘actual prejudice’ to excuse their
default—even if the error that served as the ‘cause’ is a structural one.”209
Because the Sixth Circuit “do[es] not presume actual [Sykes] prejudice even
when the counsel’s error resulted in Strickland prejudice,” it excuses
procedural default only if the petitioner demonstrates that, absent the
structural error, “the outcome of the trial would have been diﬀerent.”210

Id. at 18.
Cf. Megan Raker, Comment, State Prisoners with Federal Claims in Federal Court: When Can
a State Prisoner Overcome Procedural Default, 73 MD. L. REV. 1173, 1187 (2014) (“[T]he [Martinez]
Court clariﬁed that to overcome the procedural default, the claim must nonetheless satisfy the
prejudice prong of the cause-and-prejudice-test.”).
207 United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982).
208 Supra notes 68 & 175.
209 Jones v. Bell, 801 F.3d 556, 563 (6th Cir. 2015).
210 Id.; see also id. at 564 (“Jones [and] . . . the district court . . . conﬂate Strickland prejudice
with procedural-default ‘actual prejudice.’ They are distinct. And as Ambrose makes clear, a
meritorious structural claim does not necessarily lead to actual prejudice to excuse procedural
default. Lacking any evidence of actual prejudice, Jones has not made the requisite showing to excuse
his procedural default, even if Strickland were met.”).
205
206
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So Sykes prejudice presents the same problem in the federal habeas context
that Strickland prejudice presented in the state postconviction context.211 But
it is not necessarily amenable to the same solution. Weaver oﬀered guidance
in the speciﬁc IAC context, with IAC principles as a backdrop.212 That
guidance may not transfer into the habeas context. For one, a court might
reasonably conclude that considerations of comity and federalism instruct
that a petitioner must make an additional showing to obtain federal habeas
rather than state postconviction relief.213 For another, as explained above, the
two contexts diﬀer in their origin and therefore their ﬂexibility: one is
constitutional and the other prudential.214 This means the Court has added
ﬂexibility in determining when to excuse procedural default—ﬂexibility that
it exercised in Martinez.215
Martinez embodies a proceduralist vision of habeas law, one that insists,
as one commentator put it, that a petitioner “must be given one opportunity
for ‘a full and fair review of his constitutional claims, either in state or federal
court.’”216 Functional fairness, rather than formalist logic, motivated the
Martinez Court, which reasoned:
When an attorney errs in initial-review collateral proceedings, it is likely that
no state court at any level will hear the prisoner’s claim. . . . And if counsel’s
errors in an initial-review collateral proceeding do not establish cause to

211 At least one valiant attempt to demonstrate Sykes prejudice resulting from a racially
disproportionate jury venire was rebuﬀed. In Ambrose v. Booker, 801 F.3d 567, 575-76 (6th Cir. 2015),
the Sixth Circuit reversed a district court’s ﬁnding of actual prejudice based on the testimony of
“the nation’s foremost expert in . . . ‘the inﬂuence of race on social perception and judgment,’ ‘the
relationship between race and legal decision-making,’ and ‘the psychology of intergroup relations
and racial bias.’” The expert testiﬁed, among other things, that research demonstrated that “more
diverse juries are less likely to convict” and that the presence of non-white jurors in racially charged
cases can encourage white people to “be more conscious of biases and try to counteract [them].” Id.
at 576 (internal quotation marks omitted). On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding, among
other things, that the expert’s testimony “relie[d] on impermissible racial stereotypes.” Id. at 579; cf.
Burns, supra note 50, at 740 (“[R]equiring proof of a diﬀerent outcome would entail the court doing
exactly what it has forbidden the lawyers to do: making an inference about how jurors would decide
a case based on their race.”).
212 Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017) (noting that “the two doctrines”
involved in the case—structural error and ineﬀective assistance of counsel—“are intertwined”).
213 See, e.g., Jones, 801 F.3d at 563.
214 See supra notes 178–182.
215 Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 13 (2012) (“The rules for when a prisoner may establish cause
to excuse a procedural default are elaborated in the exercise of the Court’s discretion.”).
216 Marceau, supra note 72, at 2131 (quoting Justin F. Marceau, Don’t Forget Due Process: The
Path Not (Yet) Taken in § 2254 Habeas Corpus Adjudication, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 8 (2010)); cf. Primus,
supra note 72, at 304 (“[W]hen federal courts, including the Supreme Court, bypass procedural and
substantive obstacles to review, they often cite concerns about ensuring that criminal defendants are
able to have their federal claims fairly considered by at least one court.”).
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excuse the procedural default in a federal habeas proceeding, no court will
review the prisoner’s claims.217

The Martinez Court could not countenance the idea that, as Primus has
put it, “the more ineﬀective lawyers a state prisoner had, the less likely he
was to obtain federal habeas review.”218 Martinez’s central concern for
procedural fairness made it the “most important case” in the Supreme Court’s
2010s “proceduralist turn” in habeas jurisprudence.219
Martinez’s proceduralism became even more evident in Trevino v.
Thaler.220 In Trevino, the Court interpreted the Martinez exception to extend
to states that technically permit appellants to raise IAC claims on direct
appeal, but whose “system[s] in actual operation . . . make it ‘virtually
impossible’” to do so.221 The Trevino Court worried that it “would create
signiﬁcant unfairness” to bar federal habeas review of IAC claims arising from
states that channel, as a practical matter, trial IAC claims into collateral
review and then provide deﬁcient (or no) counsel in those collateral
proceedings.222 To one commentator, “Trevino . . . mark[ed] an unabashed
reading of Martinez as endorsing the proceduralist vision of habeas that
requires, at the very least, a full and fair opportunity to litigate each
constitutional challenge to one’s sentence or conviction.”223 It signaled “a need
to adhere to the spirit of Martinez” in the face of “formalistic limitations on
the right to full and fair review.”224
The proceduralist arc is not an uninterrupted one, and today’s Supreme
Court appears unlikely to continue it.225 Still, even non-proceduralist cases
nod to Martinez’s proceduralism. In Davila v. Davis, decided the same term
as Weaver, the Court declined to extend the Martinez exception to permit

217 Martinez, 566 U.S. at 10-11; see also id. at 14 (describing the Martinez ruling as
acknowledging, “as an equitable matter, that the initial-review collateral proceeding, if undertaken
without counsel or with ineﬀective counsel, may not have been suﬃcient to ensure that proper
consideration was given to a substantial claim”).
218 Primus, supra note 168, at 2611.
219 Marceau, supra note 72, at 2141 (“The ﬁnal and most important case in the [proceduralist]
trilogy is Martinez v. Ryan.”).
220 569 U.S. 413 (2013).
221 Id. at 417.
222 Id. at 425.
223 Marceau, supra note 72, at 2151.
224 Id. at 2154; see also Raker, supra note 206, at 1199 (arguing that, after Martinez and Trevino,
habeas’s central concern, especially with regard to procedural default, is “whether a prisoner had a
meaningful opportunity to raise an issue of prosecutorial misconduct . . . before at least one court,
state or federal”).
225 A pending Supreme Court case, Shinn v. Ramirez, will address additional practical
implications of Martinez and will reveal much about the current Court’s attitude towards habeas
proceduralism. See 141 S. Ct. 2620 (2021).
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postconviction IAC to excuse a defaulted claim of appellate IAC.226 To some,
Davila marked the end of habeas proceduralism.227 But Davila distinguished
Martinez on pragmatic, proceduralist grounds. Martinez addressed the
possibility that procedural default would insulate trial errors from review
altogether, by any court.228 By contrast, petitioners seeking to excuse
procedural default of appellate IAC claims “do not [face] the same risk.”229 If
trial counsel preserved the issue, the trial court addressed it; and if trial
counsel failed to preserve the issue, then either appellate counsel was not
ineﬀective for failing to raise it (and no relief would obtain anyway) or trial
counsel was ineﬀective for failing to raise it—in which case Martinez supplies
cause.230 The Davila Court concluded that a new route around procedural
default was “thus unnecessary for ensuring that trial errors are reviewed by
at least one court.”231
Davila could simply have said that Martinez represents a narrow, equitable
exception to the otherwise-applicable procedural default bar, declined to
extend the exception, and left it at that. Instead, the Court felt compelled to
justify its reasoning in proceduralist terms.232 And, of course, this Comment
addresses the situation in which a trial error—the deficient failure to object to
racial discrimination in jury selection—has not been addressed by any court.
Martinez, then, instructs that federal courts should not marshal procedural
default to block substantial claims of trial IAC where those claims have not
yet been presented to any court. Many petitioners ﬁnd themselves in that
precise situation: having failed to raise trial IAC on collateral review, the

137 S. Ct. 2058, 2063 (2017).
Marceau had warned, pre-Davila, that such a decision would undermine Martinez’s
“procedural preoccupation with ensuring a minimally full state process.” Marceau, supra note 72, at
2156. Marceau identiﬁed a 2013 Sixth Circuit case, Hodges v. Colson, which reached the same
conclusion as Davila. Id. at 2155. Marceau worried that because its reasoning privileged trial counsel’s
innocence-protecting function over appellate counsel’s fairness-protecting function, the decision, if
adopted broadly, would forfeit “the most promising guarantee of a procedural fairness orientation
in federal habeas” for “a continued preoccupation with innocence.” Id. at 2158; see Hodges v. Colson,
711 F.3d 589, 602 (6th Cir. 2013). Writing for the Court in Davila, Justice Thomas espoused precisely
the sort of trial IAC exceptionalism against which Marceau warned, explaining that “[t]he criminal
trial enjoys pride of place in our criminal justice system in a way that an appeal from that trial does
not.” Davila, 137 S. Ct. at 2066.
228 Davila, 137 S. Ct. at 2067.
229 Id.
230 Id.; see also Ian D. Eppler, Davila v. Davis, Brady, and the Future of Procedural Default Doctrine
in Federal Habeas Corpus, 75 NAT’L LAW. GUILD REV. 152, 158-59 (2018).
231 Davila, 137 S. Ct. at 2068.
232 Davila is emphatically an anti-proceduralist decision. It places enormous faith in trial
judges’ split-second legal decisions. See id. at 2073 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Still, its procedural
distinctions are signiﬁcant.
226
227
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claim is defaulted.233 Where the petitioner can mount a “substantial” case that
trial counsel was ineﬀective, Martinez sweeps aside the cause barrier. But the
prejudice barrier remains, and it is, if interpreted as requiring “actual
prejudice,” impenetrable.
Let us recap what the petitioner has shown to reach this point, assuming
a world that has adopted my proposed reading of Weaver for Strickland
purposes. To establish cause, the petitioner has made a “substantial” case that
his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineﬀective assistance under
Strickland—that is, trial counsel performed deﬁciently by failing to raise a
meritorious Batson objection234 and, per Part II, presumptively prejudiced the
petitioner by doing so.235 The remaining question before reaching the merits
is whether to demand the impossible prejudice showing for procedural default
purposes, despite waiving it for IAC purposes. The equitable concerns of
Martinez and Trevino counsel against that insistence.
Up to this point in the case, no court has addressed the constitutional question:
did racial discrimination infect jury selection? For the proceduralist, that is
unacceptable. The thrust of Martinez is that courts should not marshal procedural
default to make redemption of fundamental trial rights practically impossible. That
is what requiring Sykes prejudice would do. Having allowed Part II’s prejudice
presumption to satisfy cause,236 a federal habeas court should not turn around and
demand an impossible Sykes prejudice showing before it will consider remedying
a violation that caused fundamental unfairness.237
C. Objections: Habeas Exceptionalism
The Supreme Court has already, explicitly, refused to presume procedural
default prejudice arising from Batson-type errors. In Francis v. Henderson, the
Supreme Court determined that a federal court should not hear a claim
233 And since Martinez and Trevino apply not only to ineffective counsel but also to no counsel,
the group includes the many federal petitioners who litigated their state postconviction proceedings
pro se. See Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14; Marceau, supra note 72, at 2143 n.343 (“[A]rguments that a
procedural default should be excused under Martinez are no less strong if the failure to litigate a claim
can be attributed to the state’s failure to appoint counsel, as opposed to the ineffectiveness of counsel.”).
234 See supra notes 63 & 197.
235 He has also shown that postconviction counsel was ineﬀective for failing to raise the IATC
claim, but that is tangential to this point.
236 Recall that showing “cause” in this scenario involves proving ineﬀective assistance of trial
counsel, which Part II addressed. See supra Part II.
237 Cf. Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to Collateral
Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 365-66 (2006) (“Failing to address clear
evidence of racial bias in criminal cases by invoking procedural defaults or preclusion facilitates
racially discriminatory conduct and does great harm to the integrity of criminal justice review.”);
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 634 (1993) (“[T]he writ of habeas corpus has historically been
regarded as . . . ‘a bulwark against convictions that violate fundamental fairness.’” (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982))).
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similar to the one I raise here—exclusion of Black jurors from a grand jury—
absent a showing of cause and prejudice.238
The context in which Francis arose helps us understand its inapplicability
here, where the claim arises via IAC. The Supreme Court decided Francis a
year before Wainwright v. Sykes, in which it abandoned Fay v. Noia’s
“deliberate[] bypass[]”239 default excuse in favor of the much less forgiving
“cause and actual prejudice” standard.240 As Robert Cover and T. Alexander
Aleinikoﬀ outline, Francis therefore emerged during a fundamental shift in
the Court’s thinking about procedural default.241 Indeed, Justice Brennan—
author and ﬁrm proponent of Fay—dissented in Francis, denouncing the shift
it portended: “I, for one, do not relish the prospect of being informed several
Terms from now that the Court overruled Fay this Term . . . .”242
Where Fay viewed the criminal defendant as an autonomous actor who
retains his constitutional rights absent intelligent waiver, the Court in Sykes
came to view him as responsible for his lawyer’s mistakes. But this shift posits
“a combative, adversary criminal system with defendant and prosecutor
competently representing their respective positions.”243 When counsel
provides inadequate representation and therefore the “requisites of the
system”244 are absent, Sykes’s justiﬁcation falls apart. Attorney performance
that falls short of the constitutional minimum is “imputed” to the state rather
than the defendant.245 And where the state bears the blame for failing to
provide constitutionally adequate counsel, the prudential considerations
underpinning the cause and prejudice standard—that it would be “unseemly”
for the federal court to disrespect state court process246—diminish. For
similar reasons, courts permit federal habeas review of IAC claims where they
would not have permitted habeas review of the underlying claim.247 Martinez
238 Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976). As Robert Cover and T. Alexander
Aleinikoﬀ note, and as this paper posits, the cause and prejudice requirement renders such claims
eﬀectively unreviewable due to the diﬃculty of demonstrating prejudice suﬀered as a result of a
racially imbalanced (grand) jury. Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoﬀ, Dialectical Federalism:
Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1076 n.192 (1977).
239 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
240 Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87 (internal quotation marks omitted).
241 Cover & Aleinikoﬀ, supra note 238, at 1072-80.
242 Francis, 425 U.S. at 547 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
243 Cover & Aleinikoﬀ, supra note 238, at 1078; see also id. at 1079 (“Crucial to the functioning
of this process is the provision of defendant with adequate counsel.”).
244 Id. at 1080.
245 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754 (1991); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,
488 (1986); Primus, supra note 168, at 2610.
246 Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731.
247 See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986) (holding that IAC claims for failure
to object to a Fourth Amendment violation are cognizable on federal habeas review, even though
Fourth Amendment claims themselves are not, because “the two claims have separate identities and
reﬂect diﬀerent constitutional values”).
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itself recognized this distinction: “A prisoner’s inability to present a claim of
trial error is of particular concern when the claim is one of ineﬀective
assistance of counsel.”248
That insight relates to the broader objection that meets nearly every
expansion of habeas availability: habeas exceptionalism. A not-uncommon
view of federal habeas doctrine holds that habeas relief should be exceedingly
uncommon and must be more diﬃcult to obtain than state court relief.249
Extending the prejudice presumption to procedural default does the
opposite: it removes a barrier to habeas relief and equalizes the type of review
a state court would have performed (had it not refused) with the type of
review a federal habeas court performs. Especially oﬀensive, a federal court
will address the claims at issue here de novo, rather than through the
restrictive § 2254(d) (“AEDPA deference”) prism, because no state court has
addressed them on the merits.250 The simplicity of the collapsed prejudice
analyses will thus repel rather than attract some courts and commentators.
But Martinez stands for the proposition that states cannot shield their
constitutional violations from state court review and then enjoy federal
deference in the form of procedural default.251 In our hypothetical case, the
state: discriminated by race in jury selection; provided inadequate counsel
that failed to object to such discrimination; and provided no or inadequate
postconviction counsel that failed to argue trial IAC for that failure. These
errors rest with the state, not the petitioner. It is an unattractive system in

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 12 (2012).
See, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) (“Section 2254(d) reﬂects the view
that habeas corpus is a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not
a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633-34 (1993) (“The principle that collateral review is diﬀerent
from direct review resounds throughout our habeas jurisprudence. . . . In keeping with this
distinction, the writ of habeas corpus has historically been regarded as an extraordinary remedy, ‘a
bulwark against convictions that violate fundamental fairness.’” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982))). This objection may be especially vociferous given
the federalism implications of procedural default. See, e.g., Murray, 477 U.S. at 487 (“[T]he costs of
federal habeas review ‘are particularly high when a trial default has barred a prisoner from obtaining
adjudication of his constitutional claim in the state courts.” (quoting Engle, 456 U.S. at 128)).
250 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Primus, supra note 72, at 314, 316 (explaining this feature);
Marceau, supra note 72, at 2143 (same); see also, e.g., Quintero v. Bell, 256 F.3d 409, 412 (6th Cir.
2001) (reviewing a procedurally defaulted claim de novo because the state court did not address it
on the merits); Mitcham v. Davis, 103 F. Supp. 1091, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (same).
251 Primus, supra note 168, at 2612 (“Justice Kennedy . . . was clearly concerned about
precluding federal review of ineﬀective assistance of trial counsel claims when the state itself had
created a procedural system that eﬀectively prevented defendants from having an opportunity to
raise the claims in state court.”).
248
249
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which “the more ineﬀective lawyers a state prisoner [has], the less likely he
[is] to obtain federal habeas review.”252
A third, related objection worries that equalizing the state-federal playing
ﬁeld encourages sandbagging.253 Petitioners in state postconviction
proceedings, the theory goes, will opt to reserve Batson-IAC claims rather
than present them to the state postconviction court to avoid AEDPA
deference in federal court.254 Indeed, this concern played a major role in the
Francis decision.255
Even setting aside general skepticism about the prevalence of
sandbagging,256 the objection carries little weight. Since the state and federal
courts would perform the same analysis, the petitioner gains no advantage
from reserving the claim unless we posit—as federal courts are surely
unwilling to do257—that state courts do not engage in a good faith eﬀort to
vindicate constitutional rights. If they do not, federal habeas review only
becomes more essential.258 Besides, because an attorney’s strategic decisions
can almost never provide a basis for a ﬁnding of deﬁcient performance,259 the
strategic refusal—rather than incompetent failure—to raise a Batson claim at
trial or a Batson-IAC claim on state postconviction review would likely
252 Primus, supra note 168, at 2610-11; cf. Mitchell v. Genovese, 974 F.3d 638, 647 (6th Cir.
2020) (“Martinez is an equitable decision meant to relieve habeas petitioners who . . . are unable to
present their merits contentions to any court because they received two constitutionally inadequate
lawyers in a row.”).
253 See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89 (1977) (explaining the “sandbagging” concern).
254 See supra note 250.
255 Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 540 (1976).
256 See, e.g., O’Bryant, supra note 167, at 306 (“In all of the time that I have been incarcerated
and been a jailhouse lawyer, I have never witnessed a situation in which a pro se prisoner wished to
delay his post-conviction remedies. Those of us who are incarcerated and pursuing such proceedings
are doing so because we wish to be free. Intentionally or needlessly delaying the pursuit of these
remedies would be illogical and contrary to the reason we ﬁle the petitions in the ﬁrst place.”);
Stevenson, supra note 237, at 351 (expressing “[s]erious doubts . . . about the legitimacy of the
‘sandbagging problem’ in criminal litigation”); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal
Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128, 1197 (1986) (“There are . . . strong countervailing pressures against
intentionally withholding a claim for later consideration in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.”);
Stephen B. Bright, Death by Lottery—Procedural Bar of Constitutional Claims in Capital Cases Due to
Inadequate Representation of Indigent Defendants, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 679, 693-94 (1990) (indicating
that petitioners and their attorneys rarely if ever sandbag).
257 See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 636 (1993) (“Absent aﬃrmative evidence that statecourt judges are ignoring their oath, we discount petitioner’s argument that courts will respond to
our ruling by violating their Article VI duty to uphold the Constitution.”).
258 Cf. Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (“The
failure of federal habeas to help correct problems in state criminal justice systems is particularly regrettable
given evidence that states systematically violate criminal defendants’ rights.”); Lynn Adelman, Who Killed
Habeas Corpus?, DISSENT MAG. (2018), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/who-killed-habeascorpus-bill-clinton-aedpa-states-rights [https://perma.cc/BD94-U2A9] (“[F]ederal judges are far better
positioned than state court judges to protect the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.”).
259 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
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preclude a claim on federal habeas review anyway. That is, the IAC standard
already accounts for sandbagging; there is no need to fend it oﬀ twice over.
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has explained that “[t]here is no concern about
competent defense counsel who might ‘sandbag’ at trial” in the Martinez
situation because “the premise of Martinez . . . is two incompetent counsel—
trial counsel and state [postconviction] counsel.”260
CONCLUSION
Weaver arguably redeﬁned the IAC landscape and allowed victims of
Batson violations to avoid an impossible showing. But another impossible
showing meets federal habeas petitioners whose claims defaulted in state
court. To achieve Martinez’s promise, courts should extend Weaver’s
presumption of prejudice to the procedural default context.
Is Batson diﬀerent? Would my argument sweep aside procedural default’s
prejudice requirement on habeas review of any claim implicating structural
error? We only reach the untenable situation where Sykes prejudice, and Sykes
prejudice alone, bars federal habeas review of an otherwise reviewable claim
if we apply Weaver to Batson in the way I propose. I have mounted an
argument that Batson error results in fundamental unfairness in every case.
The same may or may not be true for any number of other structural errors,
and other similar arguments are no doubt worthwhile projects. Indeed, Susan
Yorke recently argued the same with regard to coercive anti-jury nulliﬁcation
instructions.261 So did a magistrate judge in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania with regard to a faulty reasonable-doubt instruction.262
The thrust of Part III is that where those arguments succeed, they should
extend into habeas. That is, where a structural error merits a presumption of
Strickland prejudice, it merits the same for Sykes prejudice. However, the case
for extending the presumption into habeas is especially strong with regard to
Batson. The jury instruction cases posed by Yorke and Magistrate Judge Hey
involve instructions that the trial court necessarily considered—since it gave
them to the jury—even if trial counsel failed to object. By contrast, no court
has considered an unraised Batson claim. Further, Batson’s harmlessness
paradox is unique.263 Batson-IAC claims thus lie at Martinez’s core: they
involve an impossible-to-surmount procedural obstacle to federal court
review of a meritorious claim that no court has considered.

260
261
262
263

Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1244 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (plurality opinion).
Yorke, supra note 113, at 1483-87.
Report and Recommendation at 36-38, Lewis v. Sorber, No. 18-1576 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2021).
For a discussion of the Batson paradox, see supra notes 120–123 and accompanying text.
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“[T]he central mission of the Great Writ should be the substance of
‘justice,’ not the form of procedures.”264 The writ has lost its way more than a
few times. It could take one small but not insigniﬁcant step towards justice
by declining to demand the impossible.

264

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 500 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).

